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The hottest story in the sizzling summer of 2010 was about someone
"getting hot" over being fired for "looking hot."' As the media reported it,
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1. Jen Doll & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Debrahlee Lorenzana Story Goes Global, Viral, Crazy,
VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS (June 7, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runnin
scared/2010/06/debrahlee loren_1.php; see Elizabeth Dwoskin, Too Hot for Citibank?, VILLAGE
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Debrahlee Lorenzana claimed that Citibank fired her for being too hot.2 This
sensational and steamy story focused media attention, albeit briefly, on some
of the most interesting aspects of employment-discrimination law.
However, Lorenzana's claim was by no means the first sex-discrimination
case focusing on appearance or hotness issues. In the 2005 case, Yanowitz v.
L'Oreal USA, Inc., a male division manager of a cosmetics company was not
satisfied with the attractiveness of a female sales associate and instructed the
associate's immediate supervisor to terminate her and "get [him] somebody
hot."3 The manager later returned and found that the insufficiently hot sales
associate was still working.4 The manager pointed out an attractive blonde
woman to the immediate suPervisor and instructed her to find an employee
who looked like that woman. When the immediate supervisor failed to follow
that order, the manager terminated the immediate supervisor, and she thereafter
6
sued for retaliation under the state employment-antidiscrimination statute.
The Yanowitz case led me to posit that appearance-based discrimination,
although it is a common occurrence, will never be covered by federal
employment-discrimination law or by many state or local employment-
discrimination laws. Nonetheless, appearance discrimination provides a
VOICE, June 2, 2010, at 18 [hereinafter Dwoskin, Too Hot for Citibank?]. The word "hot" has
multiple meanings. The most obvious definition is "having a relatively high temperature."
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 601 (11 th ed. 2003). As used in the "too hot to
work" context, a slang meaning of the word is "sexually excited or receptive." Id. Another
relevant, informal definition is "currently popular or in demand." Id. One additional meaning is
also implicated: "angry." Id
2. Ms. Lorenzana's complaint did not use the term "hot," but it did use other terms to
describe her employer's reaction to her physical attractiveness and sexiness. See generally
Complaint, Lorenzana v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 116382/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 20,
2009), available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?IndexNo= 116382-2009.
The media injected the concept of "hotness." See, e.g., Dwoskin, Too Hot for Citibank?, supra
note 1, at 1. From that point, the story caught fire. Doll & Dwoskin, supra note 1; see also Susan
Antilla, "Too Hot" Banker Lawsuit Misses Real Issues, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(June 8, 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/too-hot-banker-lawsuit-misses-
real-issues-2010 0608-xtdn.html (stating in a sarcastic manner the prevalence of the story-"[i]n
case aliens sequestered you in a spaceship for the past week"). Lorenzana appeared on both
Today and Good Morning America less than a week after The Village Voice published the story.
Doll & Dwoskin, supra note 1. As the Village Voice Blog stated, "you know you've made it
when you get your very own Wikipedia entry." Id (citing Deborahlee Lorenza, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilDebrahleeLorenzana). Alas, the Wikipedia entry was deleted on
June 14, 2010, after a debate on its permanent removal. See Debrahlee Lorenzana - Wikipedia
Article, MILOWENT (June 14, 2010), http://milowent.blogspot.com/2010/06/debrahlee-lorenzana-
wikipedia-article.html. As has been noted, the photos of Lorenzana that accompanied the first
story probably helped attract attention to the story. Antilla, supra.
3. Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1127 (Cal. 2005).
4. Id. at 1127-28.
5. Id.
6. Id at 1125-26.
7. William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty
of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 153, 158 (2007).
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mirror for reflecting on some of the most difficult and intriguing issues in
employment-discrimination law and creates an appreciation for the
complexities and nuances of that body of law. Appearance discrimination
also provides a gauge for understanding the limitations of discrimination law.9
Developments during the summer of 2010 demonstrate the popular interest
in the phenomenon of appearance discrimination. Around the time the
Lorenzana story hit the press and spread like wildfire, Stanford Law School
Professor Deborah Rhode published a book about American society's
obsession with physical beauty and the phenomenon of appearance-based
discrimination.' 0  The rapid dissemination of Lorenzana's story" and the
arrival of Professor Rhode's book,12 indicated that appearance-based
discrimination was the torrid topic in employment-discrimination law.
I. THE HOTTEST LAW OF ALL: MEDIA BLITZ AND TEACHABLE MOMENTS
Lawyers, particularly law professors, tend to find their practice or research
areas fascinating, whereas the general public often finds many aspects of the
law to be less enthralling.' 3 Employment-discrimination law should be one of
8. Id at 159.
9. Id at 162. Because appearance discrimination is such a useful model for exploring
employment-discrimination law, I always begin my employment-discrimination course by raising
questions about appearance-based discrimination as a way of introducing many of the issues that
the course will discuss.
10. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND
LAW (2010) [hereinafter RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS]; see Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of
Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034-35 (2009) [hereinafter Rhode, The Injustice of
Appearance] (discussing some of the material that later appeared in the book). In addition to
Rhode's work, other recent scholarly commentary has considered appearance discrimination.
See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican Antidiscrimination Law,
88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000); Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)lawfully Beautiful: The Legal
(De)construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2005); James Desir, Note, Lookism:
Pushing the Frontier of Equality by Looking Beyond the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 629;
Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of "Look "ism in Hiring Decisions: How Federal
Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005).
11. See Doll & Dwoskin, supra note I (reporting that less than a week after the story broke
in The Village Voice, it had been covered "in Mexico, India, Colombia, Ireland, Canada, and the
UK"); see also David Weidner, "Too Hot"for This Column: Commentary: Debrahlee Lorenzana
is the Talk of Wall Street-Why?, MARKETWATCH (June 15, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-banker-too-hot-for-wall-street-2010-06-15?dist
=beforebell ("For all of the attention Lorenzana claims to have received at work, it doesn't
compare to the stalking by the media. First, the Village Voice, then the New York Post, The CBS
Early Show, NBC's Today Show, ABC's Good Morning America, and the New York Daily
News . . . .").
12. Rhode's book immediately attracted attention. See Emily Bazelon, Just One Look, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2010, at 8 (book review); Dahlia Lithwick, Our Beauty Bias is Unfair: But
Should It Also Be Illegal?, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 2010, at 20.
13. Although this statement is debatable, people often engage with the legal issues that
interest them on an emotional level. People may get hot and bothered about affirmative action,
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the exceptions, as it addresses some of the most riveting and difficult issues
that society faces. This body of law includes issues such as affirmative action,
reverse discrimination, appearance discrimination, and sexual harassment.
However, when one actually works with or studies employment-discrimination
law, the interesting issues can get lost beneath the procedural structures and
evidentiary rules with which the law has been filled, such as the McDonnell
Douglas retext proof structure and its companion, the mixed-motives proof
structure.
Many have decried the handling of Lorenzana's sto 7 , in part because of the
slideshow of her photos that accompanied the stories. As one commentator
stated, "Gender discrimination and sexual harassment are serious workplace
issues-and in our opinion, Ms. Lorenzana's tale does female employees no
service."' 6  However, the purpose of this Article is neither to determine the
veracity of Ms. Lorenzana's allegations nor to judge the manner in which she,
but only a few are likely to understand the legal analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment or
Title VII. Moreover, television shows and movies often focus on the action-filled, dramatic, and
unrealistic lives of fictional lawyers, including television series like Boston Legal, L.A. Law, and
The Practice. See John Brigham, L.A. Law, in PRIME TIME LAW 21, 21, 27 (Robert M. Jarvis &
Paul R. Joseph eds., 1998).
14. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-47, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion),
superseded by statute in part, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat.
1071, 1075-76, as recognized in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 n.5 (2009);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). The analysis of individual
disparate-treatment claims is one of the most complicated and uncertain areas of
employment-discrimination law. To evaluate disparate-treatment claims, courts must employ the
pretext proof structure developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. at 802-05, or the mixed-motives proof structure developed in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 246-47, 258, which was subsequently modified by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76. This
already complex area of employment-discrimination law was rendered all the more complex by
the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. See 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003)
(holding that "direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases," and that a
plaintiff need only submit sufficient evidence to allow a jury to conclude by a preponderance of
the evidence that a protected characteristic was a factor in certain employment activity).
Professor Martin Katz labeled the current state of the disparate-treatment proof structures "[t]he
swamp." See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 645
& n.8 (2008); see also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among
Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REv. 83-84 (2004) (discussing the likely effects
of Desert Palace on use of the proof structures); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination
Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1888-89
(2004) (predicting that the logic of Desert Palace will have a "profound effect" on Title VII
cases).
15. See Antilla, supra note 2. Lorenzana's first attorney arranged the photo shoot, filed the
complaint, and represented her for a while; however, he was replaced by Gloria Allred within
three weeks of the story breaking. See Edecio Martinez, Debrahlee Lorenzana: "Too Sexy for
Citibank" Hires Celebrity Lawyer Gloria Allred, CBSNEWS.COM (June 15, 2010, 6:25 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083 162-20007652-504083.html.
16. Tim Gould, Too Sexy for Work: Would That Be an ADA Issue?, HR MORNING (June 3,
2010), http://www.hrmorning.com/too-sexy-for-work-would-that-be-an-ada-issue/.
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her attorney, or anyone else involved, handled her story or claim. Juxtaposed
with Professor Rhode's book, this Article seeks to use this sensational story
about alleged appearance-based discrimination to ponder a number of
significant employment-discrimination issues.17  It is important to seize the
day, as media blitzes only occasionally create such teachable moments.
II. HOT BANKERS AND THE HOT BOOK OF THE SIZZLING SUMMER OF 2010
At age twenty-one, Deborahlee Lorenzana moved to New York CitY from
Puerto Rico.' In 2010, she was a thirty-three-year-old single mother. 9 She
often was described as very physically attractive, or, as the stories described
her, "hot!" 20 In 2002, Lorenzana landed her first position in finance as a sales
representative.21 She resigned from this job in 2003, citing a hostile work
environment that had developed after she reported sexual harassment.22 In
23
2008, Citibank hired her as a business banker. Soon after, a colleague told
her that the bank branch was known for hiring "pretty girls."24  Lorenzana
alleged that her two male supervisors began making comments to her about her
dress and appearance.25 They purportedly told her not to wear clothes common
in a business office, such as fitted suits and other properly tailored clothing,
because with her figure, such clothing was too provocative and distracted her
male colleagues.26 Instead, she said that she was told to wear looser-fitting
clothing.27  She did not comply with their directives because she could not
17. Of course, because appearance is not a covered characteristic under applicable laws,
Lorenzana pled sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. Complaint, supra note 2,
at 7-9.





23. Id at 20.
24. Id.
25. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
26. Id.
27. See id at 3. The complaint states as follows:
Plaintiff opposed these unlawful workplace practices and complained to management,
pointing out that other female colleagues wore similar professional attire. In a
regressive response more suitable for reality television than a white-shoe corporation in
the twenty-first century, Plaintiff was advised that told that [sic] these other comparator
females may wear what they like, as they [sic] general unattractiveness rendered moot
their sartorial choices, unlike Plaintiff, whose shapeliness could not be heightened by
beautifully tailored clothing. Plaintiff experienced these distressing comments as
sexist, objectifying, humiliating and discriminatory.
Id
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afford a new wardrobe, and she claimed that, as part of her Latin culture,
women spend time and effort on their feminine appearance.28
Lorenzana alleged that she complained to the human resources department
about her supervisors' comments regarding her clothing.29 In reaction to her
complaint, she claimed that her supervisors did not provide her with adequate
training and that the business she brought in was assigned to other
colleagues. 30 Her supervisor then placed her on probation because of alleged
tardiness and inadequate sales. In her defense, Lorenzana asserted that she
could not have been tardy on the cited days because the branch office was
closed, and her failure to meet sales goals was a direct result of the
discrimination.3 2
Lorenzana thereafter sent an e-mail to two regional directors, in which she
complained about the hostile work environment.33  Although she did not
receive a response, she was transferred to another branch, where she alleged
that she was not permitted to do the work for which she was hired.34  She
alleged that Citibank ultimately fired her due to her clothing choices and
failure to meet new account quotas.35  Lorenzana filed suit against Citibank,
stating claims under New York City law for sex discrimination in termination,
hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation for opposing or
complaining of sex discrimination. 3 6  Because she had signed a mandatory
arbitration agreement, the court dismissed her suit, and the claim was
submitted to arbitration.37
28. See Courtney Comstock, Woman Says Citibank Fired Her Because She Was Too Hot,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 2, 2010, 7:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/debrahlee-
lorenzana-citi-2010-6.
29. Complaint, supra note 2, at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id at 4-5.
33. Id at 5.
34. Id. at 5-7.
35. Id at 7.
36. Id at 7-9.
37. See Defendant Citigroup Inc.'s Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss
and/or Stay the Proceedings, Lorenzana v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 116382/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed
Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?lndexNo= 1163
82-2009. The enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements with respect to statutory
employment-discrimination claims is a significant, hot issue. See Michael Z. Green, Measures to
Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination
Claims, 8 NEv. L.J. 58, 60 (2007). Had it been enacted, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009
would have invalidated pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements in employment, consumer,
and franchise agreements, unless provided for in collective-bargaining agreements. See S. 931,
111th Cong. (2009); Bill Introduced in Senate Would Bar Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Claims, [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 85, at A-9 (May 6, 2009). Although this topic is
beyond the scope of this Article, the argument that mandatory arbitration in employment
discrimination prevents the public from knowing of the adjudication and resolution of these
claims, given the important public policy of antidiscrimination, is pertinent. See EQUAL EMP'T
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JP Morgan Chase subsequently hired Lorenzana before her story emerged in
the beginning of June 2010. Likely less than pleased with all the attention,
her new employer purportedly ordered her to stop speaking to the media about
her claim against Citibank and threatened to fire her for noncompliance.39
According to her, a manager told her that she was violating a written code of
conduct prohibiting employees from criticizing the financial industry.40
Soon after the story gained prominence, a 2003 video clip featuring
Lorenzana surfaced. The video, entitled Plastic Surgery: Transforming Lives,
featured Lorenzana discussing her breast augmentation surgeries and saying
that she wants to look like a "Playboy playmate."41 The story provoked a
sensational and scathing backlash. Then, Lorenzana hired a high-profile
attorney, Gloria Allred, who has represented a number of "celebrity" women.43
Her new attorney immediately launched a counter-offensive against the
negative stories."
Although not the cause cgl~bre that the Lorenzana lawsuit was, a second
case involving appearance issues and related conduct was decided in the
summer of 2010-Willingham v. Regions Bank.45  Interestingly enough,
Willingham was also an apparently attractive banker who was terminated,
making it a particularly challenging summer for appearance-gifted bankers.46
Although there are numerous distinctions between Lorenzana's lawsuit and
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.002, POLICY STATEMENT ON MANDATORY
BINDING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES AS A CONDITION OF
EMPLOYMENT (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html. Lorenzana's
claims have ceased to command a significant amount of media attention since the court dismissed
her claims and they were submitted to arbitration. The diminished publicity may demonstrate the
more private nature of arbitration. However, an equally plausible explanation is the fickle and
fleeting attention of contemporary media. Although sex and sexiness always arouse public
interest, new stories arise every day. The hot topic of today will be old news in short order.
38. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Debrahlee Lorenzana Now Also Too Hot for JP Morgan Chase,
VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS (June 6, 2010, 11:29 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runnin
scaredlarchives/2010/06/debrahlee loren.php [hereinafter Dwoskin, Lorenzana Too Hot].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Helena Andrews, Debrahlee Lorenzana: A Double Take on Those Double D's,
POLITICS DAILY (June 11, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/11 /debrahlee-lorenzana-
a-double-take-on-those-double-ds/.
42. See Andrea Peyser, Call Off the Bod-Squad--This Boob Has Been Exposed,
NYPOST.COM (June 24, 2010) http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/calloff thebod squad
thisboobETk59Mw6O7C2cMTOdVJIgL.
43. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 15; Romy Ribitzky, Allred to the Rescue,
PORTFOLIO.COM (June 15, 2010), http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/daily-brief/2010/06/
15/bank-babe-debrahlee-lorenzana-hires-feminist-lawyer-gloria-allred?ana-fromrss.
44. See Exclusive: Woman Fired for Being Too Hot Says Her Boob Job Not a License to
Stare!, RADARONLINE.COM (June 15, 2010), http://www.radaronline.com/exclusives/2010/06/
exclusive-woman-fired-being-too-hot-says-her-boob-job-not-license-stare.
45. No. 2:09-cv-02289, 2010 WL 2650727, at *1-3 (W.D. Tenn. July 1,2010).
46. Id.at*l.
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Willingham, there are also a few interesting similarities. Ultimately,
Willingham's termination was not because of her appearance, but rather
because of how she used it-she brought to work copies of a magazine with
photographs of herself posing in swimwear for her co-workers to enjoy.4 7 The
bank allegedly fired her for violating the company's code of conduct and for
potentially damaging the reputation of the bank.48  Notwithstanding this
difference, the case revealed the various roles that physical appearance and
appearance-related conduct can have in the workplace and workplace
regulation.49
Professor Rhode's book hit the stands about the time the Lorenzana story
was breaking. In The Beauty Bias, Rhode provides a careful study of the
current phenomenon of appearance-based discrimination and explores its
cultural and historical underpinnings, which led her to find that appearance
bias is not new, but rather has been exacerbated by contemporary
market forces, technology, and media.50  She surveys existing
employment-discrimination law and challenges commentators who argue that
appearance should not be added as a covered characteristic.5' Finally, Rhode
considers strategies other than legal regulation for changing the culture of
appearance discrimination. 52
III. HOT LESSONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT-DISCRIMINATION LAW
This section discusses several salient employment-discrimination issues
raised by appearance discrimination, some of which are highlighted in Rhode's
book and by Lorenzana's claims. First, although physical appearance may be
one of the most commonly practiced types of employment discrimination, 53
antidiscrimination laws do not, and likely never will, protect against
54such discrimination. Nevertheless, numerous claims alleging appearance
discrimination have been fit under characteristics that are covered by existing
law.55 This strained approach to appearance-discrimination claims should raise
questions about the slippery nature of employment-discrimination law and
whether it is appropriate to fit such claims within existing coverage. This
Article argues that fitting has long been a part of employment-discrimination
47. Id. at* *1, *7.
48. Id at *3.
49. For further discussion of Willingham, see infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
50. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BlAS, supra note 10, at 49-68.
51. Id. at 101-02, 117-18, 125-40.
52. Id. at 145-61.
53. Id. at 2, 23-28.
54. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 158 (predicting that no federal and few state or local
employment-discrimination laws will cover appearance discrimination).
55. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 7-9 (stating claims for sex discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation).
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law and that it is an appropriate way for courts to address claims at the margins
of coverage.
Second, reverse-discrimination claims challenge some of the basic
principles of employment-discrimination law. If appearance were covered, a
reverse-discrimination suit would arise when a person faced discrimination for
being too attractive; this would differ from the typical or traditional claim in
which a person alleges that he or she was discriminated against because he or
she was not attractive enough. Considering such hypothetical reverse
appearance-discrimination claims raises questions about whether a historically
favored racial, religious, sex, national origin, or age group should be able to
pursue reverse-discrimination claims. Moreover, if reverse-discrimination
claims are cognizable, perhaps they should not be evaluated in the same way as
traditional discrimination claims.
The third issue is the concept of a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ), which permits employers to discriminate based on protected
characteristics if they can demonstrate that the trait, such as being male, is
essential to the job. BFOQ is a statutorily recognized defense to certain types
of discrimination; the appropriate breadth or narrowness of the defense is a
controversial and persistent topic. Appearance provides an instructive vehicle
for thinking about the appropriate scope of the BFOQ defense in
employment-discrimination law because, depending on the job, appearance
may fall anywhere along the continuum of relevant to essential.56
Other issues for which appearance discrimination serves as a useful
analytical device include retaliation, evidentiary concerns, and
at-will employment. Retaliation is the most potent claim under
employment-discrimination law and can provide some measure of protection
against appearance-based discrimination. Lorenzana's case raises questions
regarding the appropriate role in employment discrimination cases of evidence
of the victim's dress or peripheral conduct, such as the controversial 2003
video of Lorenzana. Finally, the predominant and pervasive U.S. doctrine of
at-will employment, which allows employers to terminate an employee for any
reason (good, bad, or no reason at all), is particularly problematic for victims
of appearance-based discrimination in trying to prove their claims.57  If the
forty-nine states permitting at-will employment followed Montana's lead in
56. See, e.g., Brice v. Resch, No. 10-C-711, 2011 WL 284182, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24,
2011). The Brice court explained that
[flashion boutiques, restaurants, modeling agencies, real estate companies, television
stations and countless other businesses rely overtly on staffing at least certain positions
within their companies based on physical attributes of their employees. Plaintiff was
hired as a sales specialist, and it is well known that appearance is particularly important
in the sales world.
Id.
57. See, e.g., id. (explaining that permitting a lawsuit based on termination for appearance
"would lead to a seismic disruption in the at-will employment relationship").
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abolishing employment at will,58 employers would need good cause to fire an
employee, a standard that may or may not be satisfied in cases involving
appearance. The abrogation of employment at will would diminish both
plaintiffs' and the law's reliance on employment-discrimination laws when an
employee is terminated. 59
In sum, ruminating about appearance discrimination provides insight into
several of the most significant and controversial issues in
employment-discrimination law and yields a better understanding of its
complexities and nuances. Thus, even if few employment-discrimination laws
in the United States cover appearance, delving into the topic nonetheless offers
the opportunity to better understand and perhaps improve existing law.
A. Appearance-Based Discrimination: Coverage, Non-Coverage, and How to
Fit a Claim Under Existing Employment-Discrimination Law
1. Why Appearance-Based Discrimination Never Will Be Generally
Covered
The United States has no federal employment-discrimination law that
prohibits discrimination based on physical appearance,60 unless the particular
aspect of appearance constitutes a disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.61 The District of Columbia and Michigan
prohibit some types of appearance-based discrimination.62 Additionally, there
are a handful of city and county ordinances that prohibit appearance-based
discrimination.63 Although the United States often lags behind other nations in
58. See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 392-904 (2009) (creating a cause of action for wrongful
discharge, which prohibits termination that is not for good cause).
59. Under a good-cause regime, for a termination allegedly due to appearance, the question
would not be whether the employer discriminated on the basis of appearance. Rather, the
question would be whether the employer had a job-related reason for discharging the employee.
60. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 155 (noting the lack of federal appearance laws).
61. Id. at 164 (noting employers may discriminate based on weight unless specifically
prevented by law, such as the ADA); see Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs. Inc.,
No:04-CV-3471, 2005 WL 241180, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2005) (stating, in deciding an ADA
claim, that "an employer is permitted to make hiring decisions based on certain physical
characteristics"). Obesity gives rise to "[m]ost appearance-related disability claims," which
typically are unsuccessful. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 122-23; see Jane Kom,
Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 209, 232 (2010) (reasoning that obesity is not an
"impairment" for purposes of claiming disability). Some disability-discrimination cases can be
characterized as appearance discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Chamber of Commerce
Publishers, Inc., 108 F.3d 818, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (permitting a man missing eighteen teeth
to claim disability under the ADA).
62. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02(22), 2-1402.11 (2001) (personal appearance); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 2001) (height and weight); see RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS,
supra note 10, at 125-34 (surveying state and local laws prohibiting appearance-based
discrimination).
63. SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.010, .020(13) (2010),
http://www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruzl; URBANA, ILL., CODE §§ 12-37, -62 (1998),
624 [Vol. 60:615
2011] Hotness Discrimination: The Body ofEmployment Discrimination 625
protective-employment law,6" the absence of appearance-discrimination
protection is not an example of "American exceptionalism."65
Most people probably believe that discrimination based on physical
appearance is commonplace in employment, as well as in most facets of life.
Furthermore, appearance discrimination seems to be a more significant issue
for women than men. 67 Indeed, contemporary society seems to be utterly and
completely obsessed with physical attractiveness,68 and society's affinity for
beauty seems to have real economic consequences for people.69 Recent
research indicates that there is a high correlation between beauty and
happiness, with a significant part of the happiness attributable to the beautiful
person's higher earnings, and the higher earnings of the beautiful person's
beautiful spouse.70 However, many also believe both that such discrimination
is morally wrong, or at least unfair,71 and that surely employers cannot legally
72fire someone based on physical appearance alone. This is not the case,
however, because most legislatures have not enacted laws prohibiting
http://urbanaillinois.us/citycode/TOC016; MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 39.03(2)(bb)
(2007), http:/ilibrary.municode.com/index.aspx?ClientlD=50000&StatelD-49&StateName=
Wisconsin.
64. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century's End:
Reflections on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 103-04 (1999) ("As is
generally well known, the United States historically has provided comparatively meager formal
legal protections of the employment relationship.").
65. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 134-35 (noting Australia's state of
Victoria is the only foreign jurisdiction with a law explicitly prohibiting appearance
discrimination). Regarding the issue of American exceptionalism generally, see Harold Hongju
Koh, Foreword, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1481 n.4 (2003) (defining
"American Exceptionalism" as "the perception that the United States differs qualitatively from
other developed nations").
66. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 157.
67. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 30-32; see also Jason Abrevaya &
Daniel S. Hamermesh, "Beauty is the Promise of Happiness"? 12 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.iza.org/en/papers/122_18012011.pdf ("The impacts of
beauty or its absence on satisfaction/happiness generally seem slightly larger among women than
among men .... ).
68. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at xv, 30-32.
69. See Abrevaya & Hamermesh, supra note 67, at 21 ("The majority of the impact of
beauty on satisfaction/happiness appears to be economic-through its effects on outcomes in
various markets.").
70. See id. ("Among both men and women at least half of the increase in
satisfaction/happiness generated by beauty is indirect, resulting because better-looking people
achieve more desirable outcomes in the labor market (higher earnings) and the marriage market
(higher-income spouses).").
71. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 9-11.
72. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 7 (2002) (explaining that most people do not understand that
they are employees at will and terminable without cause). Employment at will is discussed infra
in Part III.F.
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appearance-based discrimination, and most never will. Although there may be
many reasons for the paucity of such laws, two are subsequently addressed.
a. The Coverage Problem: "I'm Ugly, and Even IfI'm Not, They Think lAm."
In order to proscribe appearance-based discrimination, legislatures would
have to define the protected trait. As a threshold matter, drafting a statute may
be difficult given that appearance bias falls along a continuum.73 Assuming,
nonetheless, that a legislature enacted a law, the coverage problems would
persist. Due to the amorphous nature of physical characteristics, courts would
inevitably spend a significant amount of time determining whether the
claimant possessed the protected characteristic, no matter which characteristics
were selected for coverage in the law. This initial task of defining covered
appearance-related features is therefore one of the most significant hurdles in
enacting such legislation and could potentially present more difficulties than
any characteristic currently covered by federal employment-discrimination
law.74
In drafting the definition of a protected class, one option is to list specific
aspects of appearance, such as height, weight, facial characteristics, body
shape, dress, or grooming.75 Although enumerating particular characteristics
would make coverage determinations easier, the approach is unattractive
because it is likely to be underinclusive and thus may fail to capture much of
76the type of discrimination with which we are concerned. For example, if a
plaintiff sued for weight discrimination, an employer may be able to escape
liability by claiming it discriminated based on general appearance rather than
the particular covered trait. If drafters eschewed specifics and instead opted to
broadly prohibit all discrimination based on "appearance," meaning
attractiveness or unattractiveness, this could lead to the difficult situation of
determining whether a claimant is unattractive, or attractive, enough to make a
claim for such discrimination.n As one commentator succinctly expressed the
73. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 25.
74. See Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, supra note 10, at 1068, 1097-98 (recognizing
the problem for employers and courts in determining what aspects of appearance are protected,
but nonetheless proposing general-appearance discrimination law).
75. Id. at 1081-83.
76. By comparison, in discussions and negotiations preceding the passage of the ADA, the
drafters had to determine whether "disability" should be defined using a broad definition or a list
of specifics. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans With Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme
Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522,
539-44 (2008). The broader and more amorphous coverage term prevailed. Id. at 526.
77. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 101 ("Unlike sex, race, or ethnicity,
unattractiveness' falls on a continuum and who even falls within that category can be open to
dispute."); Corbett, supra note 7, at 174.
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problem, "Will there be a national standard of attractiveness established by
EEOC rulemaking?"78
For existing discrimination laws, the ADA protects the most amorphous
trait-disability. The main issue that arises under the ADA is whether an
individual has a "disability." 79 Much of the litigation under the ADA focuses
on whether the claimant has a disability that substantially limits a major life
activity. The ambiguous definition of disability is a significant factor in the
well-known staggering loss rate of ADA plaintiffs.8 ' Similar difficulties arise
with religion under Title VII; courts have wrestled with the determination of
what constitutes a "religion" beyond the major, protected religious groups and
traditional beliefs and practices.82 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) adopted a broad definition of "religion" in its regulation:
''moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held
with the strength of traditional religious views." 83  Though expansive, this
definition does not include all beliefs, such as the quaint belief that eating a
84particular brand of cat food is necessary for good health.
Similar difficulties and uncertainties regarding coverage would pertain to
physical appearance. As the old adage goes, "Beauty is in the eye of the
beholder." Moreover, the stigma attached to being considered unattractive
and, worse, being required to publicl, proclaim oneself so, likely would
dissuade victims from asserting claims. Vague definitions could result in a
colloquy between a judge and a plaintiff as follows:
78. James J. McDonald, Jr., Civil Rights for the Aesthetically-Challenged, 29 EMP.
RELATIONS L.J. 118, 127 (2003).
79. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 76, at 533 ("[T]he need to define the protected class renders
disability statutes different from other antidiscrimination statutes, and there is no accepted way to
define disability.").
80. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 7, at 173-74; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability
Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About
It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 139-41 (2000); Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The
New and Expanded Americans with Disabilities Act, 70 ALA. LAW. 38, 39 (2009).
81. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 7, at 174 ("The ADA did not limit the meaning of
disability to particular mental and physical impairments, but the multi-part definition has
generated much of the legal analysis in cases and spelled the defeat of many ADA plaintiffs.");
Feldblum, supra note 80, at 91-94, 139 (discussing the formation of the definition of "disability"
and how courts have construed such); Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The New and
Expanded Americans With Disabilities Act, 70 ALA. LAW. 38, 39 (2009) ("Legislative proponents
note that, in 2004, plaintiffs lost 97 percent of the ADA employment discrimination claims that
actually made it to trial, often due to the interpretation of the definition of the term 'disability."').
82. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (2010) ("In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is
religious is not at issue.").
83. Id.
84. See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (concluding that such a
belief is not religious), afJ'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979).
85. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAs, supra note 10, at 111-12.
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Judge: You say your employer discriminated against you because of
your appearance. What do you mean?
Plaintiff: I mean because I am ugly, Your Honor.
Judge: Well, you are not the most attractive person I have ever seen,
but I have seen worse. Take my clerk, for example. I doubt your
employer discriminated against you because you are ugly, because
you are not all that ugly.
Plaintiffs Counsel: With all due respect, Your Honor, my client is
hideous. To wit, res ipsa loquitur.
The stigma that might prompt some plaintiffs' reluctance would not be
present in reverse appearance-discrimination cases, like that of Lorenzana; that
is, plaintiffs may be less hesitant to file a suit if they think that they were
victimized because of their beauty or hotness.86 The fact finder, however, may
disagree with the plaintiff, creating some risk aversion on the part of plaintiffs
who believe that they are attractive.
The hypothetical colloquy above suggests that the coverage issue actually is
more complicated than the legendary one-to-ten rating scale of attractiveness.
The elusive trait of beauty, hotness, or ugliness would not be the dispositive
issue on coverage. The linchpin for coverage would be how the discriminators
regarded the victim. This differs somewhat from most other protected
characteristics. For example, with race and sex discrimination, these traits are
matters of fact that usually are readily observable by potential discriminators.
When a Caucasian employee sues for race discrimination, rarely is time spent
in litigation trying to determine whether the plaintiff is, in fact, Caucasian and
whether the alleged discriminators regarded her as such. This is not always
true of all covered characteristics. National origin, for example, is not always
known or observable. People sometimes harass or discriminate against a
person because of what they erroneously think his or her national origin to
be. 89
The ADA, which prohibits discrimination based on disability90-the most
amorphous of all traits currently covered by federal discrimination law-is
86. This proposition may be undercut by the shame and humiliation suffered by victims of
sexual harassment that impedes their assertion of claims. See, e.g., Linda Kelly Hill, The
Feminist Misspeak ofSexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REV. 133, 182 (2005).
87. Often, attractiveness and unattractiveness are judged comparatively. The determination
of a protected trait by comparison is not unknown in existing employment-discrimination laws.
Congress recognized relative characteristics in the ADA. To be covered, a physical or mental
impairment is insufficient; an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A) (Supp. Ill 2009).
88. See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. WC&M Enters., 469 F.3d 393, 397 (5th
Cir. 2007) (noting that co-workers harassed plaintiff by making statements that he was Arab and a
part of the Taliban, despite the fact that he was Indian).
89. Id.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
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instructive on the difficulty of determining whether any particular individual
would be covered by an appearance-discrimination law. Recognizing the
reality of discrimination based on perceived disabilities, Congress drafted a
three-pronged definition of "disability," which included "being regarded as
having an impairment." 9' Thus, Congress recognized that disability, like
beauty or lack thereof, is often in the eye of the beholder. However, not all
disability-discrimination cases are "regarded as" cases. Given the subjective
nature of physical attractiveness or unattractiveness, the coverage question in
all cases would be whether the discriminators thought the person was attractive
or unattractive. Though there may be cases of res ipsa loquitur-"the thing
speaks for itself"92 -most will depend upon the plaintiffs ability to prove how
he or she was regarded. Even disability is more concrete, with numerous
impairments that clearly satisfy the definition.93
b. Fighting Against Nature: People Are Hard- Wired to Be Attracted to Beauty
The reluctance to sanction appearance discrimination through law evinces a
belief that law cannot significantly reduce this type of discrimination, and
perhaps conveys a lack of moral conviction that such discrimination should be
regulated. Contemporary American society celebrates and embraces physical
beauty with an inexhaustible fervor.94 American culture is not alone in this
obsession, nor is this a recent phenomenon. 95 Preference for beauty is old,
deeply ingrained, and probably hard to extirpate. Moreover, in a visual age of
computers, the Internet, and three-dimensional images, beauty seems to be
everywhere.96 Thus, policy-makers probably lack confidence that
appearance-based discrimination law would be capable of significantly
reducing this type of discrimination. 97 Even if policy-makers believed that
such discrimination could be reduced through regulation, it is questionable
whether society has the same moral conviction about this type of
discrimination that it has about racial and sexual discrimination, for example.
In short, Americans may have qualms about the fairness of favoring beautiful
people without believing that such a preference is morally wrong, or wrong
enough to invoke legal regulation.
91. Id. §§ 12102(1)(C), 12102(3).
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (9th ed. 2009).
93. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,990 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630) (listing several physical and mental impairments that "should easily be
concluded [to] . . . substantially limit . . . major life activities").
94. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 53-68 (discussing the effects of
technology, media, and advertising on the obsession with physical beauty).
95. See id. at 45-68.
96. See id. at 53-68.
97. Id. at 13-14 ("To some courts and commentators ... a ban on appearance discrimination
asks too much. From their perspective, even if such discrimination is unfair, the law is incapable
of eliminating it and efforts to do so will result in unwarranted costs and corrosive backlash.").
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One significant concern about employment-discrimination law that is
pertinent to appearance discrimination is the focus on intentional
discrimination and the requirement that plaintiffs prove the discriminator's
motive, despite evidence that discrimination is largely subliminal and
unconscious.98 Thus, there is a disconnect between the analysis used to prove
discrimination and the way the actual phenomenon occurs. With
appearance-based discrimination, this disconnect may be exacerbated because
appearance preferences may be one of the most hard-wired types of
discrimination. 99 It seems likely that people discriminate in favor of attractive
people often without being aware of the reason for their actions. In fact,
studies indicate that babies favor attractive faces.100 However, as Rhode notes,
"considerable evidence suggests racial, gender, and disability biases are also
deeply rooted, but nonetheless subject to change through legal prohibitions." 01
In sum, legislators likely would have difficulty moving past two threshold
questions. First, can a law be fashioned that would significantly reduce
appearance discrimination? Second, assuming such a law could be drafted,
would prohibiting such discrimination run counter to a general societal value
that beauty is good and desirable, and prohibit a type of discrimination about
which society is morally ambivalent?
c. Prognosticating and Disclaiming
Considering the difficulty of writing a law that strikes an appropriate balance
between specificity and breadth of coverage, the problem of identifying those
who are covered by the law, and the unlikelihood of significantly displacing
the beauty bias, there will likely be no federal employment-discrimination law
prohibiting appearance-based discrimination, and few state or local laws.' 02
Yet, it is worth considering how a characteristic comes to be covered by
federal, state, or local employment-discrimination laws. Although not an
exhaustive list, five significant factors that lead to coverage of a characteristic
include: (1) "moral objection to the type of discrimination"; (2) "cohesive and
identifiable group"; (3) "history of discrimination on that basis"; (4)
"immutability of the characteristic"; and (5) "irrelevance of the characteristic"
to work.103 There also must be sufficient political backing for the law to pass,
which often requires activism and coalition-building.104 Captivating stories
98. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1211
(1995); Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 Mo. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (2010).
99. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 45-46.
100. Id. at 26.
101. Id. at 14, 112-16.
102. See Corbett, supra note 7, at 178.
103. Id. at 171-77.
104. Id. at 171.
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and scholarship,105 such as Lorenzana's much-publicized claim and Rhode's
book, may have the capacity to influence and shift the direction of law. When
scholarship supports the captivating stories, the chances of a law passing
sometimes increase.!o0 Once such example is the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which was signed into law by President
George W. Bush on May 21, 2008.107 By the time of its enactment, GINA had
been introduced in Congress several times, and genetic-information
discrimination laws had been enacted by a majority of the states.'08
Considering the aforementioned factors, 109  the case for the
genetic-discrimination law was far less compelling than was the case for race,
sex, age, or any other characteristic covered by the present federal
employment-discrimination laws.110  Notably, a well-chronicled history of
discrimination based on genetic information was lacking, and no other
discrimination statute has been enacted without a substantial history of
discrimination.I 1  A few stories of such discrimination existed,l12 including an
EEOC suit against Burlington Northern Railroad that received considerable
media attention.1 13 In addition to this big story, a large and growin body of
scholarship advocated for passage of a genetic-discrimination law. 14 As a
105. Professor Anita Bernstein has argued that one key to the adoption of new torts is the
paradox of agency, meaning that they have an advocate who disclaims the advocacy role. See
Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1552-59
(1997).
106. Although scholars have influenced the creation of new torts, Bernstein has argued that
the courts prefer torts that appear "independent of individual human creation." Id at 1552.
107. Pub. L.No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881.
108. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 446 & n. 28, 446-48 (2010).
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. See Roberts, supra note 108, at 441 (describing GINA as preemptive because there was
no significant history of genetic discrimination).
111. See id Roberts observed:
While some examples do exist, both GINA's advocates and adversaries agreed that
scant evidence indicated a significant history of genetic-information discrimination.
Thus, whereas the preceding laws were retrospective, GINA is preemptive. It
anticipates a form of discrimination that may pose a future threat. GINA's opponents
cited the lack of existing genetic-information discrimination as evidence that the law
was premature or unnecessary. Its proponents, however, presented GINA as a unique
opportunity to stop discrimination before it starts. It is this preemptive nature, basing




113. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Law Seeks to Ban Misuse of Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2009, at B5; Tamar Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work
Injury Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at A10.
114. See, e.g., Paul Steven Miller, Is There a Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic Discrimination
in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 263-65 (2000).
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result, genetic information joined the list of characteristics that federal
employment-discrimination law protects."
Stories and scholarship have also aided the passage of other laws. Many
cases and stories of sexual harassment, and the influential scholarship of
Professor Catherine McKinnon, led to the recognition of sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination. The common law recognition of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy owes much to an article written by
Professor Lawrence Blades 117 and stories of some abusive terminations of
employees." 8 Currently, several state legislatures, prompted by stories and
scholarship, are considering antibullying legislation.
Theoretically, stories of appearance-based discrimination, such as
Lorenzana's case, and scholarship, such as Rhode's book, may bolster the
prospects and spur the adoption of more state laws-and possibly even a
federal law-prohibiting appearance-based discrimination. Predicting the
effect of scholarship and stories in the context of appearance-based
discrimination, however, is difficult. The potential influence of Lorenzana's
story is particularly difficult to gauge. A well-publicized story about a woman
allegedly fired because of her appearance could bolster prospects for passage
of an appearance-discrimination law. If Lorenzana were an unattractive person
suing for unfair termination, she likely would evoke sympathy, but, ironically,
not nearly as much publicity. However, with an attractive woman, this story
may have the opposite effect. Legislators or judges may or may not be moved
by a claim that can be restated as "Don't hate me because I'm beautiful." 20
Conversely, attractive people often evoke sympathy, admiration, forgiveness,
or other milk of human kindness in situations in which unattractive people do
115. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (Supp. III 2009) (prohibiting genetic
discrimination in employment).
116. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
173-213 (1979) (making the case that sexual harassment is sex discrimination).
117. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1435 (1967); see Bernstein,
supra note 105, at 1523 & n.13 (citing Blades as a scholar instrumental in the formation of the
new tort).
118. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 747-49, 772 (1991)
(describing examples of abusive discharges found in cases and stating that there are a substantial
number of abusive discharges every year).
119. Drs. Gary and Ruth Namie established the Workplace Bullying Institute. See History of
Workplace Bullying Institute, WORKPLACE BULLYING INST., http://www.workplace
bullying.org/about/history.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). Professor David Yamada has brought
considerable attention to the issue through his scholarship and work with Suffolk's New
Workplace Institute and his drafting of the proposed Healthy Workplace Bill. See, e.g., David C.
Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work
Environment Protections, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 492-93 (2000).
120. See 1980s Pantene Commercial, Don't Hate Me . YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2006),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?vhz8ul-gmlya [hereinafter Pantene Commercial].
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not.121 In addition to a possible sympathy deficit, the story may cause
legislators to realize the legal and analytical complexities involved in
establishing the scope of coverage and the possible recognition of
reverse-discrimination claims.
In the end, it seems unlikely that appearance-discrimination laws will be
enacted. Nonetheless, considering the prospects for enactment of an
appearance-discrimination law fosters a better understanding of why some
characteristics come to be protected by law and others do not.
2. "Fitting" Appearance Claims Under Other Protected Characteristics
a. How the Courts Fit Claims Under Covered Characteristics
Because there is no applicable federal, state, or local law prohibiting
appearance-based discrimination, Lorenzana will need to establish another
basis for her claim. To recover under employment-discrimination law,
appearance-based discrimination must "fit" under another expressly protected
characteristic.122 Thus, instead of alleging appearance discrimination,
Lorenzana presented her claim, in part, as sex discrimination and
hostile-environment sexual harassment under New York City
employment-discrimination law. 123
There are some plausible theories available for fitting appearance-based
124discrimination under sex discrimination. To prevail in a sex-discrimination
claim, the plaintiff must prove that he or she was treated differently than a
similarly situated member of the other sex.125 In appearance cases, one basis
for a claim of sex discrimination is different dress and grooming standards for
male and female employees.126 Different dress and grooming standards
involves no stretching of sex discrimination because, on its face, it calls for
different treatment of similarly situated men and women. Nonetheless, courts
have recognized that employers usually are not going to have the same dress
and grooming codes for men and women.127 Generally, the courts tolerate
121. Rita Mahajan, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Employment, and the
Law, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 165, 166 (2007).
122. Corbett, supra note 7, at 158.
123. Complaint, supra note 2, at 7-9. She also asserted a retaliation claim. Id.
124. See Heather R. James, Note, If You Are Attractive and You Know It, Please
Apply: Appearance-Based Discrimination and Employers' Discretion, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 629,
650 (2008).
125. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("'The
critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed."' (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring))).
126. Corbett, supra note 7, at 178.
127. Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006).
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some clear discrimination in dress and grooming standards, permitting
different standards as long as the burdens on men and women are equal.128
Nonetheless, this theory of appearance discrimination as sex discrimination
is not applicable to Lorenzana's claim because she allegedly was told to dress
differently than other women, not men. 129 As her complaint states, "Plaintiff
was advised that told [sic] that these other comparator females may wear what
they like, as they [sic] general unattractiveness rendered moot their sartorial
choices, unlike Plaintiff, whose shapeliness could not be heightened by
beautifully tailored clothing."'3 0 Thus, she likely would not succeed with this
argument because this is not disparate treatment of men and women.
There are, however, other theories available for "fitting" appearance-based
discrimination under sex discrimination, in which the "because-of-sex"
standard is satisfied through forcing appearance into the category of sex. For
example, Abercrombie & Fitch, a clothing retailer that markets primarily to a
young customer base, has been sued for requiring its sales associates to have
the "A&F Look."131 Although requiring a certain look is appearance-based
discrimination, the plaintiff in one case filed a race-discrimination lawsuit
because the "A&F Look" was characterized as young, white, and preppie.132
Another lawsuit alleged that Abercrombie & Fitch engaged in sex
discrimination by restricting the number of women hired.133  Abercrombie
settled three such lawsuits, including a lawsuit filed by the EEOC, for about
$50 million.134 In a more creative lawsuit, an employee claimed that the type
of clothing Abercrombie & Fitch required its employees to wear violated her
religious beliefs.135  Lorenzana couched her claim in terms of sex
discrimination, but it is unlike the Abercrombie & Fitch cases and other claims
in which an individual purports to be disadvantaged because the employer
favors the appearance of one protected class over another. 136  Lorenzana
claimed that she was discriminated against because she was an attractive
woman, not that her superiors favored the appearance of males instead.
128. Id at 1109-10.
129. Complaint, supra note 2, at 3.
130. Id.
131. See Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, supra note 10, at 1064 (noting "Abercrombie
& Fitch's celebrated policy of hiring sexually attractive, 'classic American,' white salespersons");
James, supra note 124, at 654-56 (discussing the Abercrombie & Fitch suit and describing the
image the company seeks to portray).
132. See Joyce E. Cutler, Abercrombie & Fitch Settles Race, Sex Discrimination Lawsuits for
$50 Million, [2004] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 218, at A-2 (Nov. 11, 2004).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Lawrence E. Dube, Court Sends Religious Bias Case to Trial; Employee Quit Over
Retailer's "Look Policy," [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at A-6 (Nov. 4, 2009)
(discussing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 4:08CV1470 JCH, 2009 WL
3517578 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009)).
136. See James, supra note 124, at 654.
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Gender stereotyping is another theory within the purview of sex
discrimination. This theory is used often to fit discrimination based on sexual
orientation within sex discrimination, and is common in sexual-harassment
cases. 137 The gender stereotyping theory posits that a person is discriminated
against because the victim does not fit the discriminator's desired stereotype-
the victim is not stereotypically "manly" or "womanly" enough for the job. 3 1
Gender stereotyping traces its origin to the Supreme Court's decision in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.139 In this case, the plaintiff, an associate in a
major accounting firm, claimed that she was denied partnership because she
was too "abrasive" and "macho," a woman who would benefit from "tak[ing] a
course at charm school."l 40  Applying the gender-stereotyping theory to
Lorenzana's claim, she could make a comparable contention by arguing that
she was too sexy to satisfy the stereotype of female bankers held by her
supervisors. This claim would be further strengthened if she could produce
comparative evidence that her male supervisors did not have any qualms about
employing sexy men in the same or similar jobs.
In fact, other cases have used the gender-stereotyping theory to bring
appearance discrimination under sex discrimination.141 In Lewis v. Heartland
Inns ofAmerica, Lewis, a desk clerk at a hotel in Iowa, was considered a very
good employee by her immediate supervisors.142 The director of operations
did not share this positive view because the plaintiff did not have that
"Midwestern girl look." 43 Indeed, Lewis herself described her appearance as
"slightly more masculine," and her immediate supervisor described it as "an
Ellen DeGeneres kind of look." 44 Lewis was fired-as was her supervisor
who refused to fire her-and she subsequently sued for sex discrimination
under the theory of sex stereotyping.145 She alleged the employer "enforced a
de facto requirement that a female employee conform to gender stereotypes in
order to work [a particular] shift." l46 The court of appeals, reversing summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, found sufficient evidence that the
employer had made an adverse employment decision based on a gender
stereotype.147 The court explained, "Companies may not base employment
137. Michael Selmi, The Many Faces ofDarlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
467, 468 (2007).
138. See, e.g., id
139. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by
statute in part, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76.
140. Id at 234-35.
141. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, 591 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010).
142. Id. at 1035-36.




147. Id at 1042.
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decisions for jobs such as Lewis' on sex stereotypes, just as Southwest Airlines
could not lawfully hire as flight attendants only young, attractive, 'charming'
women 'dressed in high boots and hot-pants... The court did not insist on
comparative evidence that women were treated differently than men because of
the use of a sex-specific deroatory term; the expression "[m]idwestem girl
look" applied only to women.
Willingham v. Regions Bank featured an interesting, but ultimately
unsuccessful, twist on the gender-stereotyping theory.150 The laintiff, Rhonda
Willingham, worked as a private banker for Regions Bank. She worked in
the Morgan Keegan Tower in downtown Memphis to give her "more visibility
and a better opportunity to expand her client base" via relationships and
referrals from within the building.152 However, Willingham's other high-
visibility activity troubled her employer. 153 Featured as "Ms. Cruzin' South
August 2008," she was on the cover and in photographs, wearing a bikini and
sitting on motorcycles and cars. 154 The caption of one photo read "I have been
Primped," with the "r" distinguished by a different font and color.i15 The
magazine included a brief autobiography of Willingham that mentioned her
employment, but did not disclose the name of the bank.156 In recompense for
her posing, she received about fifty complimentary copies of the magazine.157
Willingham took several of the copies to work and gave them to co-workers. 58
Her supervisor got a copy and forwarded it to the human resources department,
which resulted in Willingham's termination. 159  She signed a termination
notice stating that her conduct was potentially damaging to her reputation as a
personal banker as well as to the reputation of Regions Bank. The notice
also stated that she violated the employer's code of conduct and demonstrated
poor judgment.161
Willingham sued the bank for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.162
She argued a sex-stereotyping theory to satisfy the "because-of-sex"
148. Id (alteration in original).
149. Id at 1041.
150. Willingham v. Regions Bank, No. 2:09-cv-02289, 2010 WL 2650727, at *3-4 (W.D.
Tenn. July 1, 2010).




155. Id. at *1 & n.3.




160. Id. at *2.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *3.
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requirement.163 She alleged that "her physical appearance in a non-work
related magazine did not comport with [the employer's] feminine stereotype
which . . . required her to dress or appear 'conservatively' at all times." 64 The
court rejected her claim on the ground that she did not allege that her employer
reacted to her nonconformity to a gender stereotype at work; her employer
reacted to her "non-work-related activity."l 65  The court also rejected her
disparate treatment claim under the McDonnell Douglas analysis because her
comparator was not similarly situated.166 Willingham produced evidence that a
website for a five-kilometer road race used a picture of a male RePions Bank
employee running shirtless and wearing "skimpy" running shorts.16 The court
found that the male comparator was not similarly situated to Willingham
because he worked for a subsidiary of the plaintiff's employer, had a different
supervisor, and did not distribute copies of his picture at work. 168
These cases demonstrate that some appearance cases fit under the category
of sex discrimination using the theory of sex or gender stereotyping. These
cases also demonstrate some of the limitations of the theory. The principal
limitation is that the plaintiff must prove that the employer acted based on a
stereotypical view of how men or women should look in the workplace.169 The
absence of comparators often is fatal to these claims.170  Typically, the
gender-stereotyping theory will not help either beautiful or ugly men and
women who are fired for appearance unless they connect it with different
treatment of the sexes, although as Lewis demonstrates, comparative evidence
is not always required. 7 '
Other than sex, Lorenzana may have been able to fashion her claim as
discrimination covered by existing laws by relying on a national origin
argument. Lorenzana mentioned that it is part of her Latin culture for a woman
to spend time making herself look very feminine for work.172 This argument
presents the seeds of a national-origin claim. For example, plaintiffs have
argued that a particular fashion was so closely associated with a particular race
or national-origin group that to discriminate on the basis of that fashion was
163. See id
164. Id
165. Id. at *4.
166. Id at *4, *6.
167. Id at *6.
168. Id
169. See id at *3-4.
170. See, e.g., id at *6-7. But see Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040-41
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding that comparative evidence is not required to succeed on a
gender-stereotype sex-discrimination claim).
171. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
172. Dwoskin, Too Hot for Citibank?, supra note 1, at 23.
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the equivalent of discrimination based on race or national origin.1 73 Although
Lorenzana may have some difficulty proving that the look she was told to
change was characteristically Latin, this is one possible approach to fitting
appearance claims under protected characteristics. Lorenzana's claims would
likely not fit into any other protected characteristics.1 74 Although this is not
her argument, it is easy to see how a number of appearance claims could fit
under age discrimination. In a society that is obsessed and infatuated with
youth, a youthful look may be unattainable for persons in the protected class
over forty.' 75
Fitting claims of discrimination based on characteristics not expressly
covered by existing employment-discrimination laws into protected
characteristics is not limited to appearance claims. For example, claims for
sexual-orientation discrimination are not yet covered by federal
employment-discrimination law,176 although they are addressed by the law of a
substantial number of states and many local ordinances. 178 However, some
plaintiffs have been able to fit claims of sexual-orientation discrimination or
harassment under sex discrimination. 179 Yet another example is discrimination
173. See, e.g., McManus v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 952-54 (D.C. 2000)
(concerning the discrimination claim of a woman who dressed in African-styled attire and wore
her hair in traditional African fashions).
174. One may consider whether an appearance claim could be placed under the coverage of
the ADA. This is unlikely. One writer, attempting to answer this question, sardonically mused:
"Perhaps this case should spark new legislation to protect those unfortunates who, through no
fault of their own, are so attractive that they're an irresistible workplace distraction. Maybe it's a
new form of disability." Gould, supra note 16.
175. See Mark R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title VI1 and Trait Discrimination Plus One
Simple Solution (A Totality of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 1006-07
(2009) ("The current culture's obsession with youth and beauty also manifests a form of
appearance discrimination against the elderly and the ugly. Businesses that pursue youthful
looking employees may run counter to the prohibitions of the ADEA . . . .").
176. See Recent Proposed Legislation: Employment Discrimination-Congress Considers
Bill to Prohibit Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity.-Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), 123
HARV. L. REV. 1803, 1803 (2010) (noting that "no federal statute expressly proscribes
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation" and describing the proposed
Employment Nondiscrimination Act).
177. See Derrick Cain, Supporters Tell Senate Panel ENDA Necessary: Opponents Criticize
Provisions, [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213, at A-10 (Nov. 6, 2009) ("12 states and the
District of Columbia have enacted statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity. Another nine states bar job discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation alone.").
178. See, e.g., Tripp Baltz, Salt Lake City Adopts Ban on Job, Housing Bias Based on Sexual
Orientation, [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at A-I1 (Nov. 19, 2009).
179. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that the plaintiff stated a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII notwithstanding the
fact that harassment may have been motivated by the victim's sexual orientation).
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claims based on caregiver or family-responsibility status, which often are
couched in terms of sex, race, or disability discrimination.' 80
3. "Fitting ": Courts Properly Patrolling the Fringes ofEmployment-
Discrimination Law
Considering the phenomenon of "fitting" in the context of appearance-based
claims and claims for other characteristics, one may question whether this
practice should cause concern. Specifically, are employment-discrimination
laws being stretched in unintended ways, and could this phenomenon discredit
employment-discrimination law in general? This is unlikely. Arguably, fitting
is how employment-discrimination law should function-a core of protected
characteristics with a penumbra of characteristics that can fit under them in
appropriate cases.
In some cases, courts' acceptance of fit theories presages legislative action.
For example, gender stereotyping and other theories that have been used to fit
sexual orientation under sex discrimination likely are harbingers of the
eventual passage of a federal law prohibiting employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation. 8 ' Yet, courts are able to control theories when they
believe that they stretch the existing law too far.182 For example, a husband,
wife, and daughter who were fired by a company filed suit alleging, in part,
that their termination constituted sex discrimination.183 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' claims, stating that familial status is not protected under Title VII.184
Thus, fitting affords courts some discretion in patrolling the fringes of
employment-discrimination law. Enacting new employment-discrimination
laws is difficult, contentious, and costly. The political battles, the controversy,
and the potential backlash involved in attempts to enact statutes that add
protected characteristics to discrimination-law coverage present obstacles that
often stymie such efforts. This is particularly true in the global economy;
some argue that new employment laws will over-regulate and drive businesses
out of the country. 85  Fitting also provides courts a vehicle for reining in
180. The EEOC issued a guidance document in 2007 on such discrimination. See EQUAL
EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES (2007), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why
Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of "Real" Workers,
58 U. KAN. L. REv. 355 (2010) (discussing discrimination claims of caregivers).
181. See, e.g., supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2008) (noting that a sex-discrimination claim was, in fact, a claim of discrimination based on
familial status, a classification that is outside the scope of Title VII).
183. Id. at 1140.
184. Id at 1141, 1148-49.
185. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-First
Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 697-98 (1993) (arguing
that too much regulation of employment will put the United States at a competitive disadvantage);
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employers who are abusing their prerogative under the employment-at-will
doctrine.
B. Discriminating Against "Hot" People: The Challenges ofReverse
Discrimination
Lorenzana's claim illustrates an interesting question about appearance
discrimination: "Would there be reverse-discrimination claims for the
appearance-gifted?"' 87  "Reverse discrimination" refers to discrimination
against a member of a group that historically has not been discriminated
against, such as a race-discrimination claim by a Caucasian.18 When
discussing the unfairness of discrimination against people because of physical
appearance, one seldom considers discrimination against "hot" or beautiful
people. Yet, that is Ms. Lorenzana's claim, and it is plausible that some
employers would prefer not to have employees whose attractive or sexy
appearance is the dominant impression they make on co-workers, customers,
or both. Thus, her claim is a reminder of the difficulties presented by
reverse-discrimination claims-difficulties that challenge the very foundations
of American employment-discrimination law.
There is a cogent argument that reverse-discrimination claims are
merely discrimination claims, and they should be treated the same
as traditional discrimination claims.189 To treat them differently is itself
discrimination and violates the equal-treatment underpinnings of
employment-discrimination statutes and perhaps the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 Alternatively, there is a counterargument
that Congress was not principally addressing problems of reverse
discrimination when it passed employment-discrimination laws, and perhaps
did not intend to cover such discrimination at all.191 Thus, the first question
is whether a reverse-discrimination claim is covered by a particular
employment-discrimination law. The answer has varied based upon the
Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market
Forces, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 34 ("More frequently will the argument be heard and accepted that a
country cannot afford extravagant employment-law protections when other countries are only
providing efficient protections.").
186. See infra Part III.F.
187. Corbett, supra note 7, at 171.
188. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional
and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1034-36 (2004)
(discussing the concept of reverse discrimination).
189. Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the
phrase "reverse discrimination" as having no bearing on the Title VII analysis and stating that
"[dliscrimination is discrimination no matter what the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
of the victim"), overruled in part on other grounds, 529 F.3d 961 (1 Ith Cir. 2008).
190. Sullivan, supra note 188, at 1099-1118.
191. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (holding that
Congress did not intend the ADEA to prohibit employers from favoring older employees).
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discrimination statute at issue. The Supreme Court has held that
reverse-discrimination claims are viable under Title VII for racel92 and sex,193
and courts have assumed that this principle holds for other characteristics
covered by Title VII. 194
In contrast, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, the Court held
that reverse age-discrimination claims are not actionable under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).1 95 That result was not obvious,
and there are strong arguments in both the majority and dissenting opinions in
the 6-3 decision.' 96  Reverse-discrimination claims are a viable issue under
Title VII because everyone is covered by at least some of the protected
characteristics.197  Although the ADEA differs because it does not cover all
ages, it does encompass a broad band of ages, applying to employees
forty-years-old or older; thus, in theory, a forty-two-year-old could be
discriminated against based on her relative youth in favor of an older
employee.198 However, the Court in General Dynamics rejected the concept
that employees between forty and fifty years old could challenge an
employment action as discriminating against them because they were too
young to qualify for the benefit. 199 The ADA, in contrast, protects only
qualified individuals with disabilities; thus, there can be no reverse claims by
the nondisabled.200 If physical appearance were a protected characteristic, it is
192. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (explaining that
the provisions of Title VII were intended to apply to white individuals as well as those of
minority races).
193. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998) (recognizing
that a claim by a man for same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII). The Oncale
decision supports the proposition that a class without a history of discrimination, which includes
harassment, may file suit under Title VII. Moreover, the courts routinely have assumed that men
could sue for discrimination and harassment. See, e.g., Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679,
686 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that sexual-harassment law is not limited to the typical case of a
woman harassed by men).
194. See, e.g., Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In this
employment discrimination case, we address the plaintiff's burden to raise a triable issue of fact
as to pretext under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime in the context of a
less familiar claim of 'reverse' religious discrimination.").
195. 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
196. See id. at 596-98; id. at 601-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 602-13 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
197. See Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that Title
VII provisions are not applicable only "to members of historically discriminated-against groups").
198. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 540 U.S. at 591-92; id. at 604-05 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
199. Id at 584-85, 600 (majority opinion).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (Supp. Ill 2009). This point seemed clear under the original
ADA, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101(8), 102(a), 104
Stat. 327, 331-32, but Congress expressly provided the following in the ADA Amendments Act
of 2008: "Nothing in this Act shall provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a
disability that the individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual's lack of
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unclear whether courts would permit beautiful or attractive plaintiffs to recover
for reverse discrimination, and existing discrimination law does not furnish a
definitive answer.
Given that plaintiffs can pursue reverse-discrimination claims for most of
the protected traits, some courts have required these plaintiffs to prove their
cases differently than plaintiffs in traditional discrimination cases. 20 The most
common example is the requirement that a plaintiff go beyond the typical
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case by proving "background circumstances"
that establish that the subject employer engages in nontypical
discrimination.202 This is a controversial principle because it does not treat all
persons equally and therefore seems to violate a core principle of
discrimination law.203 However, the usual assumptions on which the analytical
frameworks for intentional discrimination were based do not apply equally to
reverse-discrimination cases.204
Thus, reverse-discrimination claims cause considerable difficulty in the
existing employment-discrimination law. Treating reverse-discrimination
claims differently than traditional discrimination claims, although
reasonable-at least in terms of the proof structures under which they are
analyzed-poses at least two dangers: (1) possible constitutional infirmity
disability." ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3553,
3557-58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201(g) (Supp. 111 2009)). Perhaps the perceived need to
make this clear came from cases such as Woods v. Phoenix Society, in which a plaintiff claimed
he was discriminated against because he did not have a mental illness. No. 76286, 2000 WL
640566, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App., May 18, 2000).
201. See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 66-67 (6th Cir. 1985)
(requiring a plaintiff in a reverse-discrimination case to establish, not only the standard prima
facie case, but also certain "background circumstances").
202. See id at 67 (requiring a showing of background circumstances in a
reverse-discrimination claim); Sullivan, supra note 188, at 1065-71 (discussing background
circumstances). Courts have also applied the background-circumstances requirement to reverse
disparate-impact claims. See, e.g., Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252
(10th Cir. 1986).
203. See, e.g., Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004) (explaining
that the "background circumstances" requirement imposed on plaintiffs in reverse-discrimination
claims "draws a distinction between plaintiffs on account of race . . . and is thus inconsistent with
the Civil Rights Act). Additionally, the Sixth Circuit in Cline v. General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc-the precursor to the aforementioned Supreme Court's decision in the same
case-stated:
[W]e do not share the commonly held belief that this situation is one of so-called
"reverse discrimination." Insofar as we are able to determine, the expression "reverse
discrimination" has no ascertainable meaning in the law. An action is either
discriminatory or it is not discriminatory, and some discriminatory actions are
prohibited by the law. . . . [T]he protected class should be protected; to hold otherwise
is discrimination, plain and simple.
296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
204. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 188, at 1061-65.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment205 and (2) adverse reaction from judges, and
perhaps the public, who believe that discrimination law should not itself
discriminate. Therefore, whether an employment-discrimination law
prohibiting discrimination based on physical appearance would cover
reverse-discrimination claims is an intriguing question. Further, if
reverse-discrimination claims were recognized for appearance, it is unclear
whether plaintiffs would be required to prove more, such as background
circumstances, to prevail. Although a strong case can be made that the
appearance-challenged need legal protection to prevent the disadvantages
likely to be visited upon them because of their relative unattractiveness, the
argument for the appearance-gifted needing protection from the disadvantages
imposed on them because of their beauty is less compelling.
With regard to Lorenzana's suit, writers have often referenced the infamous
line from a 1980s shampoo commercial: "Don't hate me because I'm
beautiful." 206 Reverse-discrimination appearance claims likely would evoke
about as much sympathy as the pleas of the model in the shampoo commercial.
The courts might reject such claims, invoking a rationale similar to that of the
Supreme Court in General Dynamics, in which the Court reasoned that when
Congress used the term "age discrimination" it had in mind the meaning that
207most people have in common usage-discrimination against older people.
However, there are undoubtedly jobs for which employers do not hire very
attractive people; for example, women may not be hired or promoted to some
jobs because of the stereotype that beautiful women lack intelligence or
gravitas.208 Another likely type of discrimination against attractive women is
that they may be relegated to jobs or job duties that utilize their looks for gain,
regardless of what other abilities and skills they possess.
It is not clear whether reverse-discrimination claims would be
cognizable if appearance were a covered characteristic, and if they
were, whether the analysis of such claims would differ from traditional
appearance-discrimination claims. The inconsistencies in the law regarding
the currently covered characteristics reveals the nuanced complexity and
controversy of the employment-discrimination laws.
C. Would Hotness or Lack Thereof Be a Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification?
Both Title VII and the ADEA include a statutory defense for discriminating
on the basis of protected characteristics if the characteristic constitutes a "bona
205. See id. at 1102 (noting that the use of different proof structures for
reverse-discrimination claims is problematic under the Fourteenth Amendment).
206. See Pantene Commercial, supra note 120.
207. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 597-98 (2004).
208. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 31 ("[I]n upper-level positions that
historically have been male-dominated, beautiful or 'sexy' workers are subject to the 'boopsy
effect': their attractiveness suggests less competence and intellectual ability.").
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fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) that is essential to a particular
business's operations. 2 09 The BFOQ affirmative defense, although expressly
provided by Title VII, applies to only sex, national origin, and religion claims,
not race or color claims. o The BFOQ defense, as developed in the case law,
recognizes that there are narrow circumstances in which a covered
characteristic actually may be relevant and "reasonably necessary" to the
job.211 The test the courts have developed to determine the aF~licability of the
BFOQ defense is very difficult for a defendant to satisfy. The test first
identifies the essence of the business, as determined by the court, not the
employer, and then asks whether that essence makes it necessary for the
employer to discriminate on the basis of the protected characteristic. 213
Some of the most significant cases in which defendants raised BFOQ
defenses involved claims of sex and appearance discrimination. Although the
claims against employers have been for sex discrimination because they hired
only women for particular jobs, the employers actually were hiring women
with a certain appearance, whether it be attractive, sexy, or slim.
Although it is a district court decision, one of the best-known BFOQ cases is
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.214 In Wilson, Southwest Airlines hired only
women for the high customer-contact positions of flight attendant and ticket
agent.215 Wilson and over one hundred other men who were denied those jobs
sued for sex discrimination, and Southwest defended on the ground of
209. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The ADEA states that "[i]t shall
not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Title VII similarly provides that "it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of
his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
211. Id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (providing the BFOQ affirmative defense for the
ADEA).
212. See Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VIIs Concession to Gender
Discrimination, 16 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 169, 173-90 (2009) (noting that, if a plaintiff
makes a prima facie case, the employer may raise BFOQ as an affirmative defense, but "the
burden of proof . .. is difficult to meet"); Claire Tower Putnam, Comment, When Can a Law
Firm Discriminate Among Its Own Employees to Meet a Client's Request? Reflections on the
ACC's Call to Action, 9 U. PENN. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 666-71 (2007) (discussing the BFOQ
defense as interpreted in case law).
213. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 195, 202-03, 206 (1991)
(interpreting BFOQ for sex under Title VII); W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 407, 420
(1985) (interpreting BFOQ for age under the ADEA).
214. 517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Kimberly Yuracko, Private Nurses
and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 40 COL. L. REV. 147, 158
(2004) ("The most famous plus-sex BFOQ case is that of Wilson v. Southwest Airlines.").
215. 517 F. Supp. at 293.
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BFOQ.216 The argument deviated from the usual version of BFOQ-that only
a woman could do the job-and instead took the form that Southwest's
clientele, businessmen flying between major Texas cities, preferred the female
image that was at the heart of the airline's "Love" market brand.217  The
agency that developed the marketing campaign described the desired female
employee as follows: "This lady is young and vital . . . she is charming and
goes through life with great flair and exuberance . . . you notice first her
exciting smile, friendly air, her wit . . . yet she is quite efficient and approaches
all her tasks with care and attention .. 218
219The court in Wilson rejected the BFOQ defense. It found that the essence
of the airline's business was transporting passengers safely and quickly,
rejecting Southwest's argument that the essence of its business was to transport
passengers with a certain panache-with love.220 Having stripped Southwest's
hiring practice to its essence, the court concluded that females did not uniquely
possess the ability to perform the job duties of ticket agent and flight
attendant.221
Frank v. United Airlines is another airline case that involved the BFOQ
defense.222 In Frank, the defendant airline used weight tables based on body
frames to set maximum body weights for flight attendants.223 The maximum
weight for males was based on large body frames, and the maximum weight
224for females was based on medium body frames. Consequently, only females
225who were substantially lighter than males qualified for these jobs. The
airline defended on the ground that its practice was an appearance standard
226
and, therefore, nondiscriminatory.26 The court conceded that employers are
permitted to have different, but equally burdensome, dress and grooming
standards for female and male employees; however, the airline's standards
216. Id
217. Id. at 294-96, 300.
218. Id. at 294 (alterations in original). The court further described how Southwest's
marketing campaign relied on appearance and sex:
Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of Southwest's public image.
Its T.V. commercials feature attractive attendants in fitted outfits, catering to male
passengers while an alluring feminine voice promises in-flight love. On board,
attendants in hot-pants (skirts are now optional) serve "love bites" (toasted almonds)
and "love potions" (cocktails). Even Southwest's ticketing system features a "quickie
machine" to provide "instant gratification."
Id. at 294 n.4.
219. Id at 304.
220. Id at 302.
221. Id
222. 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000).
223. Id at 848.
224. Id
225. Id.
226. Id at 854.
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placed a greater burden on women and were thus facially discriminatory, and
227could only be lawful if a BFOQ defense applied. The court found that the
airline failed to put forth evidence that the standard it applied to its employees
was a BFOQ, such as evidence of how weight affected the employees' ability
to provide physical assistance in an emergency.228 As such, the airline's
defense did not prevail.22 9
Finally, in a famous case that never went to trial, the EEOC investigated
Hooters restaurants for the company's refusal to hire men as servers, and for
restricting the position of "Hooters Girls" to females. 230 Hooters argued that
being female was a BFOQ for being a Hooters girl.231 The EEOC had the
better of the legal arguments, but "Hooters embarked on a public relations
campaign apparently intended to make the EEOC's position look foolish."232
Eventually Hooters reached a settlement with the EEOC in an agreement that
required Hooters to create gender-neutral positions, but permitted the company
to continue its hiring practice for servers.23
The BFOQ cases demonstrate the importance of appearance to many
employers in many jobs. Although Southwest, United Airlines, and Hooters
were sued for hiring exclusively women for particular jobs, they were focused
on women with a particular look in order to satisfy what they perceived to be
their customers' preferences. Abercrombie & Fitch also has been sued for
hiring only sales associates that have the "A&F look," but those suits were
couched in terms of race claims to which BFOQ does not apply. 2 34
If appearance were a protected characteristic, would BFOQ be a recognized
defense? The problem is precisely the one identified by the court in Wilson: if
employers could argue that they make more money when customers are drawn
to their attractive employees, the otherwise narrow BFOQ defense would be
greatly expanded.235 Indeed, BFOQ cases under existing law suggest a reason
227. Id. at 854-55.
228. Id. at 855.
229. Id.
230. Gregory J. Kamer & Edwin A. Keller, Jr., Give Me $5 Chips, a Jack and Coke-Hold
the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Appearance Issues in the Gaming Industry, 7 GAMING L. REV.
335, 341 (2003); Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex
Discrimination, 31 U. MICH. L.J. 551, 567-68 (1998).
23 1. Schneyer, supra note 230, at 567-68; see Patricia A. Casey, Sex Discrimination: Does
Refusing to Hire Men as Food Servers Violate the Civil Rights Act?: No: A Business Has a Right
to Choose Its Own Character, A.B.A. J., Feb 1996, at 41, 41 (discussing whether the hiring
practices of Hooters constitute sex discrimination).
232. Schneyer, supra note 230, at 568.
233. Kamer & Keller, supra note 230, at 341.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32, 210.
235. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (1981). Specifically, the Wilson
court noted that
Southwest's position knows no principled limit. Recognition of a sex BFOQ for
Southwest's public contact personnel based on the airline's "love" campaign opens the
door for other employers freely to discriminate by tacking on sex or sex appeal as a
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why physical appearance is not, and never will be, a characteristic generally
covered by employment-discrimination laws. Not only do people routinely
discriminate based on appearance, but many employers also do it as a matter of
policy or practice. Some employers may simply prefer to hire attractive
women as a matter of personal taste, but many believe that their business will
enjoy higher profits as a result of such hires. Some businesses actually build
attractive individuals into their business identity, 236 as did Southwest Airlines
in the Wilson case.237 In Wilson, though the court rejected that argument as a
matter of law, it was true as a matter of fact. 238 Hooters and Abercrombie &
Fitch also seem to have strong arguments with regard to the facts; although one
sells food and the other clothing, respectively, the companies also market their
employees-sexy, young people. 239
The BFOQ defense rarely has been successful when the argument has been
customer preference 240 or lost profits, 241 but the inclination to prohibit
employers from discriminating based on appearance is weak. Consider, for
example, that Hooters' aggressive public-relations carm aign, including appeals
to legislators, caused the EEOC to drop the case. In the Wilson case,
although the court held that Southwest Airlines could not satisfy the BFOQ
defense, it closed its opinion with the following passage, which suggests the
court had some discomfort with the litigation and the result:
One final observation is called for. This case has serious
underpinnings, but it also has disquieting strains. These strains, and
they were only that, warn that in our quest for non-racist, non-sexist
goals, the demand for equal rights can be pushed to silly extremes.
The rule of law in this country is so firmly embedded in our ethical
qualification for any public contact position where customers preferred employees of a
particular sex.
Id
236. See Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, supra note 10, at 1064 ("[E]mployees'
attractiveness can be an effective selling point, and part of a strategy to 'brand' the seller through
a certain look." (footnote omitted)).
237. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295.
238. Id (noting that Southwest's image "played and continues to play an important role in
the airline's success," but that it was not "necessary for the continued success of its business").
239. See Kevin P. McGowan, Panel Discusses Legal Issues Arising from Job Segregation in
the Workforce, [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 63, at C-I (Apr. 6, 2009) (quoting attorney
Bill Lann Lee as saying that Abercrombie & Fitch had a "very deliberate marketing strategy" of
"selling not just a product, but an image" to white, teenage consumers).
240. See, e.g., Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1068 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(rejecting a BFOQ defense based on customer preference).
241. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that cost
alone cannot justify discrimination, although the Court observed that it was not faced with a case
in which the business would be financially ruined by the requirement of nondiscrimination).
242. See Schneyer, supra note 230, at 568; see also About Hooters, HOOTERS.COM,
http://www.hooters.com/About.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (recounting Hooters' publicity
campaign).
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regimen that little can stand up to its force--except literalistic
insistence upon one's rights. And such inability to absorb the minor
indignities suffered daily by us all without running to court may stop
it dead in its tracks. We do not have such a case here--only warning
signs rumbling from the facts. 243
Thus, appearance discrimination is a pervasive practice of employers and a
matter of customer preference and business marketing, and, if BFOQ were
recognized as a defense, it would be asserted often by employers. Those same
considerations influenced Congress not to include a race or color BFOQ in
Title VII.244 In the end, however, Congress likely would recognize a BFOQ
defense to appearance discrimination because society does not possess the
same moral revulsion toward appearance discrimination that it does toward
race discrimination.
If appearance were a protected characteristic and BFOQ were a recognized
defense to appearance-based discrimination, employers would be able to argue
that attractiveness, sexiness, or slimness was a BFOQ for some jobs.
However, consider the opposite issue raised by Ms. Lorenzana's claim-there
are occasions where employers would argue that unattractiveness, lack of
sexiness, or an unslim figure was a BFOQ. Of course, this would be an issue
only if reverse appearance-discrimination claims were recognized.24 5  If
appearance-discrimination law followed Title VII with regard to its recognition
of sex as a BFOQ, the defense would work both ways. 24 But legislatures and
courts would undoubtedly question whether employers need or should have a
BFOQ to defend discriminating against beautiful people in favor of
unattractive people.
In fact, some employers may not hire very beautiful or sexy people for some
jobs. Ms. Lorenzana claims that her supervisors told her that she distracted her
247male colleagues from their jobs. It is not hard to imagine a case in which an
employer would think that a stunningly attractive or sexy woman would not be
taken seriously in a particular job.24 This concept relates to the theory of sex
or gender stereotyping, which posits that people discriminate against a man or
woman in a job who does not fit the discriminator's stereotype of what a man
243. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 304-05.
244. See Manley, supra note 212, at 196-98; Putnam, supra note 212, at 663-64. Indeed,
had Congress, by excluding race and color from BFOQ, and the courts, by developing a stringent
BFOQ test, not made BFOQ such a narrow defense, a customer preference BFOQ very well may
have eviscerated the prohibitions on discrimination.
245. For a discussion of the issue of reverse discrimination, see supra Part III.B.
246. See Manley, supra note 212, at 174-76.
247. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
248. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BlAS, supra note 10, at 31; see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil,
653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the argument that sex was a BFOQ because clients
in Southeast Asia and Latin America would not take seriously a woman serving as Director of
International Operations of a company).
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or woman in that job should be.249 Finally, some employers might avoid hiring
very attractive or sexy women, or perhaps men, because they fear liability
resulting from other employees sexually harassing the beautiful person. Thus,
it is not unreasonable to suggest that some employers might discriminate
against the appearance-gifted. The question, then, becomes whether they
would be afforded the BFOQ defense.
This discussion of BFOQ elucidates much about employment-discrimination
law. BFOQ law indicates the difficulty posed by prohibiting discrimination
based on a particular characteristic on the one hand, and, on the other,
admitting that the characteristic in some cases will be so relevant to a job that
employers ought to be able to consider it. The balance between prohibiting
discrimination and accommodating employers' interests is difficult to strike. It
is made more difficult because the test developed to evaluate BFOQ strikes at
the heart of employer autonomy and prerogative, as courts define the essence
of a business and often reject employers' conceptions of their essence.250 The
omission of race and color from the Title VII BFOQ shows that when
Congress is very serious about a type of discrimination, it will not even try to
251accommodate employers' interests. Finally, appearance has been a
dominant theme in BFOQ cases because employers frequently discriminate
based on appearance and then argue the common-sense relevance of
appearance to jobs.
D. Retaliation: The Most Potent and Dangerous Claim
Even if appearance never becomes a protected characteristic, there still is
some refuge for victims of such discrimination under the antiretaliation
provisions of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. 252  The antiretaliation
clauses provide that it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate
against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices that violate the
statute or for participating in investigations, proceedings, or hearings that are
conducted under the statute. 253 Employers should fear retaliation claims more
than any other discrimination claims for at least two reasons: (1) a claimant
can win a retaliation claim even if she loses the predicate discrimination
249. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
250. Yaracko, supra note 214, at 169; see Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting Southwest's contention that providing air travel with a "love"
atmosphere is the essence of its business).
251. See Manley, supra note 212, at 195-99.
252. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (ADEA antiretaliation provision); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(Title VII antiretaliation provision); 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (ADA antiretaliation provision). See
generally B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REv. 439 (2008).
253. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 12203.
254. See, e.g., George, supra note 252, at 467; Eve I. Klein & Rosemary Halligan, A Rising
Tide of Retaliation Claims Challenges Employers to Adopt Adequate Preventive Measures, N.Y.
ST. B.J. Sept./Oct. 1999, at 51, 51.
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claim;255 and (2) the elements of proof for a retaliation claim are more easily
satisfied than those of other discrimination claims.256 Claimants often make a
prima facie showing of causation-one element of a retaliation claim-merely
by establishing temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.257 In 2006, the Supreme Court adopted a
plaintiff-friendly definition of the adverse-employment-action element in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, holding that a claimant
establishes an adverse employment action if the action taken by the employer
"might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination."' 2 5 8  Retaliation claims have been on the rise in
recent years,259 and plaintiffs have enjoyed considerable success in pursuing
such claims.260
Retaliation claims are important to appearance-based discrimination
because, if federal and most state employment-discrimination laws are not
amended to cover appearance as a characteristic, the existing antiretaliation
provisions of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA offer an avenue of
recovery.261 Plaintiffs often assert their appearance claims by "fitting" them
under Title VII or the ADEA.262 It is not necessary that the plaintiff prevail on
such a claim in order to assert a successful retaliation argument.263 However,
the claimant must establish a reasonable and good-faith belief that the
employer's action is a violation of Title VII or the ADEA.264 Therefore, if a
plaintiff can claim that an employer discriminated on the basis of appearance;
make a connection to a characteristic covered by Title VII, the ADEA, or the
255. Klein & Halligan, supra note 254, at 52; see Wright v. CompUSA,Inc., 352 F.3d 472,
477 (1st Cir. 2003) ("An ADA plaintiff need not succeed on a disability claim to assert a claim
for retaliation.").
256. See George, supra note 252, at 467 ("The success of retaliation claims, as compared to
the underlying complaint of discrimination, may be due in part to the more relaxed standard of
'discrimination."'). There are three elements to a retaliation claim: (1) the claimant engaged in
protected activity-opposition or participation activity; (2) the employer took adverse action
against the employee; and (3) a causal cunncciun exists between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Id. at 445.
257. Id. at 458-59.
258. 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
259. See CHARGE STATISTIcS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2010, EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011)
(indicating an increase from 22.6% of all discrimination charges filed in 1997 to 36.3% in 2010).
In 2010, retaliation was the most frequently asserted discrimination charge, narrowly edging out
race discrimination. Id.
260. See George, supra note 252, at 467 ("[Rletaliation claims had a higher success rate than
any of the underlying claims of discrimination.").
261. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part III.A.
263. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
264. The Supreme Court has never expressly approved this standard, but it has been routinely
applied by the lower federal courts. George, supra note 252, at 449 & n.38.
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ADA; report that conduct internally; and then suffer adverse employment
action, there is a viable prospect for a successful retaliation claim. Of course, a
claim of appearance-based discrimination that was not linked to a protected
characteristic would not set up a viable retaliation claim.
Ms. Lorenzana asserted a retaliation claim in her complaint,265 and it seems
the most promising basis for recovery. Notably, the range of protection
afforded by antiretaliation law is demonstrated not only by the retaliation claim
asserted in her complaint, but also by the retaliation claim that her first
attorney threatened to file against her subsequent employer, JPMorgan
Chase. Lorenzana alleged that her employer warned her to stop speaking
out in the media about her claims against Citibank because she was violating
an employee code of conduct that forbids employees from doing things that
damage the reputation of the financial industry. Her first attorney threatened
268that if Lorenzana were fired or disciplined, she would sue JPMorgan. Her
conduct would likely come under the opposition clause.269 As mentioned
above, one must have a reasonable and good-faith belief that the action one is
opposing is illegal under the relevant employment-discrimination law. 270it
seems clear that Lorenzana was speaking out against what she believed to be
discriminatory conduct; the resulting analysis likely would focus on whether it
was a reasonable belief.271
Another limit on conduct protected by the antiretaliation provisions is that
both unlawful opposition conduct and extremely disloyal conduct lose
protection. As such, Lorenzana's high-profile approach of airing her case in
the media and perhaps violating a code of conduct imposed by her subsequent
employer could have caused her otherwise protected activity to lose protection.
265. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5, 7-9.
266. Paul Thompson, Bank Girl Faces Being Fired from Latest Job for Talking About
Dismissal from Citigroup for Being "Too Sexy," MAIL ONLINE, http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article- 1285026/Debrahlee-Lorenzana-faces-fired-JPMorgan-Chase-
talking-dismissal-Citigroup-sexy.html (last updated June 9, 2010).
267. Dwoskin, Lorenzana Too Hot, supra note 38; see also Thompson, supra note 266.
268. Thompson, supra note 266.
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].").
270. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
271. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-4.
272. See, e.g., George, supra note 252, at 449 & n.41. The Supreme Court has held that
illegal conduct can lose protection. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
803-04 (1973) (explaining that Title VII does not work to "compel[] an employer to absolve and
rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against it"). What is not clearly
resolved is the extent to which legal, disloyal conduct loses protection. See Hochstadt v.
Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976) (explaining that
courts must "balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities
opposing sexual discrimination, against Congress' [sic] equally manifest desire not to tie the
hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel").
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Although this is unlikely, the facts present interesting issues. Many employees
think that they have First Amendment rights of free speech and expression in
the workplace, but they do not have these rights because they work for private
employers who, unlike government employers, are not subject to the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment. 2 3 However, some federal laws
provide protection to some forms of private-sector employee speech and
expression, such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)274 and
antiretaliation provisions of employment-discrimination laws.275 With both the
NLRA and the antiretaliation provisions, however, the courts are mindful of
employers' reasonable expectation of loyalty and their right to maintain
discipline in the workplace.276 Codes of conduct, such as the one allegedly
maintained by JPChase,277 have become a common way for employers to state
their expectations regarding employee conduct and loyalty.278 Still, such codes
of conduct may, as written or as applied, infringe on statutory rights of
employees.279
The retaliation claim that Lorenzana asserted in her complaint and the one
that her lawyer threatened are reminders that the antiretaliation provisions in
existing employment-discrimination law significantly broaden coverage
beyond the expressly covered characteristics. Moreover, retaliation claims are
the most potent and feared discrimination claims, and they are being used by
plaintiffs more often than ever before.280
273. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (describing First Amendment rights
of public employees); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy
Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1524 (2007) ("The First Amendment, like
much of the rest of the Constitution, erects a line between private actors and state actors.").
274. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). For a discussion of the NLRA as a source of protection for
employee speech and expression, see William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the
Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259,
286-96 (2002).
275. See supra note 255.
276. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,
477-78 (1953) (holding that legal but disloyal employee disparagement of the employer lost
protection under the NLRA); Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 230 (observing, in the context of a Title VII
claim, that "[a]n employer remains entitled to loyalty and cooperativeness from employees").
277. See supra notes 38-40, 48, 161 and accompanying text.
278. See Matt McKay, Employee Code of Conduct, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.
com/employee-code-conduct-2731.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
279. See Hochstadt, 454 F.2d at 230-31 (noting that, under Title VII, employees are
protected from being discharged "for filing complaints in good faith"); see also William R.
Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum
and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 41-45 (2006) (discussing cases
involving employer rules that, as written or as applied, violate the NLRA by restricting employee
communication).
280. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
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E. The Admissibility and Signficance ofEvidence Regarding Appearance and
Peripheral Conduct in Employment-Discrimination Cases
Lorenzana's chances of success on her claim may be affected by her
appearance and some of her nonwork-related conduct. Some criticism in the
media was directed at the handling of the case for the photographs
accompanying the original Village Voice story281 and, to a greater extent, for
282the 2003 video about her second breast augmentation that surfaced. A
number of Lorenzana's statements in the video provoked writers to question
whether she was a victim of discrimination or a person seeking attention and,
perhaps, fortune. 283 Yet, the relevance of her statements in the video as well as
their admissibility in a trial or arbitration proceeding is debatable. A common
issue in sexual-harassment cases concerns whether evidence of the alleged
victim's appearance or nonwork conduct is admissible, and, if it is, the effect it
has on the case.284
The issue of a plaintiffs appearance and conduct arose in 1986 with the
Supreme Court's first major decision regarding sexual harassment.28 In
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the defendant argued that the plaintiff,
who was allegedly sexually harassed by her supervisor, wore provocative
286clothes and had sexual fantasies. The Court concluded that such evidence
was "obviously relevant," and that there was no per se rule against its
admissibility. 28  Accordingly, the Court remanded to the lower court with
instructions that it weigh "the applicable considerations" in deciding whether
the evidence was admissible.288 The Court's point was that the evidence is
relevant to one element of the prima facie case for hostile-environment sexual
harassment: whether the harassment was unwelcome.289 After the Meritor
case, Congress amended a rule of evidence to make evidence of the alleged
victim's other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition generally
inadmissible.290 The rule provides an exception and renders such evidence
admissible if "its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party." 291 Even if the party who
281. See Antilla, supra note 2 (discussing the photos of Lorenzana in "sexy poses" that were
included in a June 1, 2010, article in the Village Voice newspaper).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
283. See supra note 47.
284. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (discussing the
admissibility of evidence of the plaintiff's dress).
285. See id at 57-63.
286. Id. at 65.
287. Id. at 69.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 68-69.
290. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
40141(a)-(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 1919.
291. FED. R. EvD. 412(b)(2).
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seeks to have such evidence admitted satisfies the standard, the rule provides
292
specific procedures that must be followed for the evidence to be admitted.
A notable case raising issues of dress and nonwork conduct is Burns v.
McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc.293 In this case, which predates the 1994
294amendment of Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412, the district court held
that a woman who was a victim of sexual harassment could not recover
because she would not have been offended by the conduct,295 although a
reasonable woman may have been. The district court reached that conclusion
because the plaintiff had posed nude for some magazines outside of the
workplace, which had no connection to her work.2  The Eighth Circuit
reversed, stating as follows:
The plaintiffs choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work
hours is not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her
employer's work-related conduct offensive. This is not a case where
Burns posed in provocative and suggestive ways at work. Her
private life, regardless how reprehensible the trier of fact might find
it to be, did not provide lawful acquiescence to unwanted sexual
advances at her work place by her employer. To hold otherwise
would be contrary to Title VII's goal of ridding the work place of
any kind of unwelcome sexual harassment. 297
Thus, a general rule has emerged that, in sexual-harassment cases, evidence
regarding other sexual activity and predisposition, including dress, is not
generally admissible.
Given this rule, it is questionable whether evidence of Lorenzana's 2003
video would be admissible in her case. The answer is difficult to predict
because she stated her claims under the New York City
298employment-discrimination law.29 The analogous state evidence rule applies
to criminal cases only, 299 unlike Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 412, which
applies to criminal and civil cases.300 However, if courts applied a balancing
test, like that under the federal rule, that weighs the probative value of the
evidence against the unfair prejudice that would result, 3  various courts would
likely strike that balance differently. Even if the evidence were admitted, it is
unclear whether it would have much impact on the successful establishment of
292. Id. 412(c).
293. 989 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1993).
294. Compare Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 40141(a)-(b),
with Burns, 989 F.2d at 959.
295. Burns, 989 F.2d at 962.
296. Id. at 962-63.
297. Id. at 963.
298. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1, 7-9.
299. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 2004).
300. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
301. See id. 412(b)(2).
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Lorenzana's claims. Although there is a good argument that, even if the
evidence were admitted, it should not affect the plaintiffs claims, as in the
Burns case,302 it is not farfetched to suggest that a fact-finder may not look
sympathetically upon a plaintiff suing for sex and appearance discrimination
after it is shown a video in which the plaintiff says she wants to look like "a
Playboy playmate."
Issues regarding evidence of peripheral conduct are not limited to
sexual-harassment cases. In a religious-discrimination case, an employee
charged that her employer, Abercrombie & Fitch,303 required her to wear
clothes that conformed to the company's brand, which she described as
"'ripped-up jeans, a little revealing, sporty, California beach style, laid back,"'
and, notably, "the length of skirts and dresses sold by Hollister at that time as
falling just below the buttocks." 304 Although the employee initially conformed
to the dress requirement, after having a religious experience, she objected to
the dress requirement, explaining that, because of her recently adopted
religious beliefs, she must wear skirts that fell below her knee. 305 She alleged
that the employer made no effort to accommodate her religious beliefs, and she
resigned.30 The EEOC filed a lawsuit on the employee's behalf.
307 The court
denied the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment because there was a
genuine issue re arding whether the employee sincerely held the asserted
religious beliefs. 3 8 The issue was created when the former employee wore a
309formfitting shirt to her deposition in the case. The court explained that the
former employee's dress at her deposition was "potentially inconsistent with
her alleged faith."310
Thus, contemplating appearance discrimination serves as a reminder that the
admissibility and relevance of appearance and other conduct evidence are
common and controversial issues under existing discrimination law.
F. Why Are Hot People and Ugly People Employees at Will?
Appearance-based discrimination and Lorenzana's claim also highlight the
most important principle in U.S. employment law, employment at will, and its
interaction with employment-discrimination law. Rhode notes that only one
302. See Burns, 989 F.2d at 963; see also supra text accompanying notes 293-97.
303. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 107 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1029, 1029 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009).
304. Id at 1029-30.
305. Id. at 1030.
306. Id
307. Id
308. Id. at 1031.
309. Dube, supra note 135, at A-6. When questioned by the defendant's attorney about
wearing the shirt, she argued that the shirt was not "tight," but she admitted that it was "body
conscious." Id
310. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1031.
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jurisdiction in another nation-the Australian state of Victoria-has an
appearance-discrimination law.311 However, if the facts alleged by Lorenzana
are correct, she would have a cognizable claim in most nations, not under their
employment-discrimination laws, but under their general termination laws. 312
Most nations have laws that require emplo ers to have a job- or
33business-related reason to terminate an employee. The United States is a
maverick, with forty-nine of fifty states adhering to employment at will,
pursuant to which employers may fire an employee "for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all."314 Therefore, in every U.S. state except Montana,
an employer does not have to offer good cause for termination unless the
employee claims that the reason for termination constitutes a breach of
contract, amounts to a tort, or violates a statute. 3 15 As such, federal, state, and
local employment-discrimination statutes are the most significant restriction on
the U.S. employment-at-will regime.316 Thus, if Lorenzana was fired for her
appearance or for complaining about how her supervisors treated her, she
would have a claim for dismissal without good cause in most nations and in
311. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 134-36.
312. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practice of International Labor & Employment Law:
Escort Your Labor/Employment Clients into the Global Millennium, LAB. LAW., Summer 2001,
at 1, 13 ("American businesses are steeped in their unique and peculiar employment-at-will
doctrine, which even other Anglo-system countries like England, Canada, and Australia rejected
years ago."); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 65 (2000) ("The United States, unlike almost every
other industrialized country and many developing countries, has neither adopted through the
common law or by statute a general protection against unfair dismissal or discharge without just
cause, nor even any period of notice."). Unsurprisingly, the United States has not ratified the
convention of the International Labour Organization on Termination of Employment, which
provides that "employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational
requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or service." International Labour Organization,
C158 Termination of Employment Convention, art. 4, June 22, 1982, available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C 158. The convention has been ratified by thirty-two
countries. CONVENTION NO. C158, INT'L LABOUR ORG. (2006), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/ratifce.pl?C158.
313. See Summers, supra note 312, at 65-66.
314. David C. Robinson, The First Decade of Judicial Interpretation of the Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REv. 375, 376 & n.3 (1996)
(quoting Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. Unit A July
1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Forty-nine states are characterized as
employment-at-will states. The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987
removes that state from the list, although weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914
(2009).
315. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 862-71 (1994) (discussing statutory,
contract, and tort exceptions to employment at will).
316. See Laws Enforced by the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/.
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Montana, unless the employer could demonstrate that appearance was related
to job performance.317
Employment at will is relevant to appearance discrimination in another way.
Specifically, some argue that federal law prohibiting appearance discrimination
would result in backlash from businesses. Businesses generally prefer not to
have additional characteristics covered by employment-discrimination laws
because they would rather operate without regulation, or at least with as little
as possible. On the matter of employment termination, employment at will
is the ultimate expression of the absence of regulation. However, employment
at will provides employers far less freedom to discharge employees than
appears at first blush, and it is vastly overrated in its value to employers. There
are numerous exceptions to employment at will contained in federal and state
statutes, tort theories such as wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,
and contract concepts, among others.320 Thus, when an employee is fired, she
will explore whether she can fit her termination into one of these exceptions.
With the existing employment-discrimination statutes and other exceptions to
employment at will, there are few situations in which employers could
terminate an employee without providing a3good reason and then adequately
defend themselves in any resultant litigation.
317. As discussed, in the context of a BFOQ, there may be jobs for which courts would
accept an employee's appearance as relevant, and perhaps essential, to adequate job performance.
See supra Part III.C. There are jobs for which an employer will not hire someone unless she is
attractive enough. See supra text accompanying notes 227-37. However, once a person is hired,
her termination for insufficient attractiveness is less likely. Still, there are numerous possible
scenarios in which this may occur. Lorenzana, for example, claimed that her employer contended
that her appearance became distracting to her male colleagues. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
Thus, an employer may hire a person and later find the employee's appearance is problematic
because of the reactions of co-workers or customers. Moreover, appearance can change
suddenly; for example, a person's image may be altered after an accident that causes scarring.
Appearance also can change over time. Aging affects appearance, and an employer may prefer
the appearance of youthful beauty to the appearance of wrinkled distinction and experience.
318. See RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 10, at 110 ("[A] business community united
in frustration at a bloated civil rights regime could become a powerful political force for reform
or even repeal." (quoting RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT
BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 176 (2008)).
319. See Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 792 (1997) (describing likely business opposition to an
amendment of the ADEA as "opposition to a radical expansion of federal regulation of the
employment relationship"); cf RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 86 (1992) ("The employment relation provides a far less
suitable target for state regulation.").
320. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
321. See Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for
Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 113 (2006). Libenson
explains that
[t]he fear of being sued by a former employee based on one of the growing number of
exceptions to the at-will rule causes employers to engage in a variety of expensive and
inefficient self-protective activities, including intrusive pre-hire background checks,
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Although most people in the United States likely think that it is unfair to
terminate an employee based on her physical appearance, the basic premise of
U.S. employment law-employment at will-permits such a termination. This
tension exists because employers greatly value the employment-at-will
doctrine. Nonetheless, the law recognizes numerous exceptions, and
employers must exercise caution and understand that employment at will does
not give them an unfettered right to terminate for any reason.
The connections between employment at will, contract, and tort theories of
recovery, and employment-discrimination law are highlighted in an unusual,
322recent case alleging appearance discrimination-Brice v. Resch. The
plaintiff alleged that, after she accepted a job offer, it was rescinded because
the company's CEO did not like her "body shape" and "did not consider her
the kind of woman he would be inclined to sexually harass or with whom he
would want to have a consensual romantic relationship." 323 The plaintiff sued
based on her termination, asserting state law claims of tortious interference
with contract and breach of contract and a violation of Title VII.324 The court
dismissed both her state contract and tort claims on the ground that they would
contravene employment at will.325 The plaintiff argued that the state
recognizes a tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.32 6 The
court acknowledged that the state recognizes a narrow public-policy tort
exception to employment at will, but did not find it applicable to the plaintiffs
alleged claim. The court stated that "accepting [the plaintiffs] position
[regarding the public policy tort] would lead to a seismic disruption in the at-
will employment relationship."3 The court further noted that many types of
businesses, under the protection of employment at will, make employment
decisions "based on physical attributes of their employees." 329 The court then
commented on the questionable morality but clear legality of such
discrimination:
This is not to say that discrimination on the basis of appearance is
praiseworthy or a noble product of our culture. But I do not believe
Wisconsin courts would conclude that a CEO who prefers to hire
attractive women (in his subjective view) for sales jobs has violated
any public policy. To hold otherwise would open a Pandora's box
continuous documentation of even minor employee misconduct, and failing to fire poor
performers.
Id
322. No. 10-C-711,2011 WL 284182, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2011).
323. Id
324. Id.
325. See id. at *1-4.
326. Id at *3.
327. Id at *3-4.
328. Id. at *4.
329. Id
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and create a protected class out of millions of at-will employees who
could allege they were fired or passed over because they had gained
a few pounds over the holidays or developed a pimple.33
The Brice court well understood and succinctly articulated all of the
following: the freedom of employers to engage in appearance discrimination
afforded by employment at will when unchecked by
employment-discrimination laws, the common occurrence of such
discrimination in many types of jobs, and some of the difficulties that would be
posed if legislatures embarked on regulating such discrimination. Although
the court engaged in hyperbole, citing hypothetical claims based on additional
pounds or pimples, it correctly noted the significant incursion on
employment at will if employees generally could contest terminations.332
Media coverage about this and other appearance-discrimination cases may
cause people to misunderstand the current state of the law. Most people do not
appreciate the meaning of employment at will-that workers can be fired for
any reason.333 People who hear stories about employers being sued for
appearance-based discrimination may incorrectly believe that that current law
prohibits this type of discrimination, regardless of the accuracy of the reports.
The Lorenzana story provides a good opportunity to explain that, in the United
States, a person fired based on her appearance would have a viable claim only
under employment-discrimination laws. In contrast, in many nations under
for-cause termination laws, a person fired for appearance would have a claim
for wrongful termination, not a violation of discrimination laws.334
Some claim that American discrimination laws are becoming bloated and
cover too many characteristics. 335 This argument may miss an important point:
if a just-cause termination law existed, there would be less clamor for an
expansion of coverage under employment-discrimination law. The answer to
Lorenzana's claim and Rhode's call for expansion of discrimination laws may
be that we should consider another option, the modification of employment at
will.336  The relationship and balance between employment at will and




333. Estlund, supra note 72, at 9.
334. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the employee may not
prevail even in a good-cause regime if appearance is significantly related to job performance.
335. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 319, at 1-5 (noting the scope and effects of
antidiscrimination laws); WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 48-49 (1997) (noting the vast number of statutes,
lawsuits, and literature addressing discrimination).
336. There is no dearth of scholarship calling for the abrogation or modification of
employment at will. See, e.g., Libenson, supra note 321, at 114. A recent ambitious proposal
calls for enactment of a national termination law. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of
Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REv. 89, 91-92 (2008). Another recent proposal
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IV. CONCLUSION
Appearance discrimination unquestionably was the hot employment-law
topic of the summer of 2010. Debrahlee Lorenzana's claims against Citibank
for sex discrimination and Professor Rhode's book about beauty bias
converged to bring the issue to the attention of the public and the legal
profession. Ironically, appearance-based discrimination is not covered by
federal employment-discrimination laws or by many state or local laws.
Perhaps future developments will lead to a federal appearance-based
discrimination law. However, such a statute is unlikely. Regardless,
appearance discrimination is a very real and common form of discrimination in
employment and in life generally, and it provides a most revealing mirror for
reflecting on many of the intriguing and controversial issues in current
employment-discrimination law. Even if an appearance-based discrimination
law never is enacted, more discussion and greater understanding of the existing
discrimination laws and resultant opportunities to improve them would provide
an attractive legacy to the hot summer of 2010.
calls for a "pay-or-play" regime in which employers would be required to give notice followed by
a period of continued employment or payment in lieu of notice for terminations not based on
employee misconduct. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at
Will, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7 (2010).
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